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C H A P T E R  11  
Wesley J Wildman 
I N T R O D U C T I O N  
The chapters in this volume report on traffic at the intersection of evolu- 
tionary theory and the scientzjic study of religion, by which I mean the inter- 
disciplinary study of the cognitive, emotional, psychological, social, and 
communicative elements of religion using the methods of the natural and 
social sciences. (Note: I shall italicize key terms throughout this chapter at 
the place where each is defined to help readers formed in quite different intel- 
lectual contexts track what I mean.) The scientific study of religion has pro- 
found connections to the wider academic study of religion-that is, religious 
studies, pursued by religionists, to use a term that seems to be gaining cur- 
rency. It is also deeply connected to scholarly reflection on religious beliefs 
and practices-that is, theology, pursued by theologians, who may belong to 
theistic and nontheistic religious traditions or may have religiously nonaf- 
filiated or secular projects. If religionists are usually the outsiders who strive 
for neutrality in their study of religion, theologians tend to be the insiders, 
making a virtue of their existentially lively religious commitment to gen- 
erate profound insights that outsiders cannot easily grasp or express. Of 
course, there are exceptions in both cases. 
Cooperation between experts interested in religion from all specializations 
and perspectives should produce a deeper understanding of the evolution 
of religious beliefs and behaviors and thereby of the origins and functions 
of religion. I am one of a growing number of scientists, religionists, and 
theologians who acknowledge that as a worthy goal. Our motivations do 
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not always cohere. W e  probably all find religious phenomena intrinsically 
fascinating, and we can certainly all see that religion is often a crucial fac- 
tor in geopolitics, economics, social change, and culture wars. We probably 
work in the hope that understanding will bring empathy and self-control, as 
it does so often in other facets of life. Some may go further and imagine that 
understanding religion may give us the power we need to eliminate it and 
to deliver its victims into humanistic enlightenment. Others might dream of 
a form of religion that can remain authentically spiritual while being fully 
aware of its evolutionary origins, social functions, psychological dynamics, 
and economic implications. Despite these discrepant motivations, coopera- 
tion seems feasible, and I think we can suspend our hidden or not-so-hidden 
social agendas for the sake of a quest for understanding. 
Unfortunately, gaining an interdisciplinary understanding of religion is 
more difficult than it might seem. The scientific study of religion, religious 
studies, and theology are quite different discourses and sometimes shock- 
ingly disconnected. As one who bridges all three, I have concluded that they 
are not incommensurate, but they are very often so differently angled that 
fitting them together is challenging. This conceptual jigsaw is simplest when 
religionists and theologians allow the scientist to do his or her thing, as h a p  
pens in this volume, and then see how that affects their projects. But many 
more complex interactions are possible. 
Consider religious studies and the scientific study of religion. Religious 
studies as a field is deeply committed to registering the complexity and 
intricacy of religion in its phenomenological descriptions, historical recon- 
structions, and sociological models. I t  is profoundly interdisciplinary, much 
as olitical economy is. Because of its encompassing nature, religious studies 
av the ability to absorb and respond to scientific perspectives on religion d
without having to abandon its own fundamental methodological commit- 
ments. The scientific study of religion has a different set of commitments. 
Scientists work within methodological limitations that promote the simplifi- 
cation of endlessly complex religious phenomena to the few salient features 
that prove tractable for scientific investigation. Scientists can be interested in 
the whole complexity of religion and do well to know something about it for 
the sake of avoiding embarrassing caricatures. But their first commitment is 
to finding something they can chew on, so they must argue (or simply hope) 
that selecting certain limited strands from the interwoven fabric of religion 
does not invalidate their results. 
This strikes religionists as appallingly reductionist. T o  them, the descrip 
tions of religious phenomena that some scientists offer, without any trace of 
self-consciousness or hint of apology, are comically or, perhaps, dangerously 
oversimplified. Religionists feel certain that a high conceptual price is being 
paid for this reductionist strategy even when they do not immediately know 
how to advise the scientist who would gladly work with a more nuanced 
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interpretation of religion. At the very least, the price of casual reductionism 
is a social one. Most people in the large world cultures of the contemporary 
world listen to scientists no matter what they are saying. Their propagation 
of superficial understandings of religion can have potentially serious social 
and political consequences, from distorted understandings of religion and 
deep suspicion of science in the general religious public to the gradual loss 
of scientific prestige as reeducation painstakingly corrects careless scientific 
oversimplifications. 
Nevertheless, science still achieves fascinating results in its study of reli- 
gious beliefs and practices. Knowing that religious ideas take certain repeat- 
able forms or that a tendency toward certain religious behaviors is heritable 
can be highly useful within the broader framework of religious studies. T o  
make use of these benefits, religionists must get past their allergic reac- 
tion to the reductionist approach. Unfortunately, the field of religous stud- 
ies has paid little attention to the scientific study of religion. That needs to 
- 
changeand  quickly. Scientists have been setting a challenging new agenda 
for religious studies over the past several decades, and it is time that more 
- 
religionists engage it, if only to test it from their own perspectives. 
The scientific study of religion affects theology, too. Theology typically 
ventures its own claims about the origins and functions of religion, perhaps 
through an intellectual interpretation of a founding narrative, through a doc- 
trine that purportedly conveys a divinely revealed truth about the purpose 
of a religious ritual, or through a reflective interpretation of the astonishing 
experiences that can occur in meditation or corporate worship. Such theolog- 
ical claims typically concern only one part of a single religion, and few theo- 
logians ever attempt to coordinate such claims into a theoretical edifice that 
arches across religious traditions. In fact, most theologians generally seem 
uninterested in religion in the sense of the whole collection of phenomena 
that religious studies examines-not a good thing, in my view, but under- 
standable given the way theologians often work on behalf of living religious 
communities. More important for our current concerns, theological claims 
frequently do not harmonize well with what the scientific study of religion 
has to say about the evolution of religious beliefs and behaviors and about the 
origins and functions of religion. Theologians have usually avoided this con- 
flict problem, just as religionists have, by withdrawing into supportive com- 
munities with social identities strong enough to maintain local plausibility 
structures regardless of wider intellectual currents. From such local havens 
of acceptance and relevance, they need pay no social price for ignoring what 
scientists say about the evolutionary origins and functions of religion. 
By contrast, there are intellectually compelling subtraditions within most 
theological traditions that seek to engage what other intellectuals have to 
say about matters of concern to theology. Such theologians-the ones likely 
to pick up a book of this sort-exert  great effort to learn what religionists 
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and scientists have discovered about religion and seek to take account of 
those discoveries in their theological theories. Theological theories on some 
topics may operate conceptually independently of the scientific study of reli- 
gion. But many theological theories have conceptual and logical traction 
with parts of the scientific study of religion; indeed, some scientists seem 
to presume this when they informally and sometimes publicly pronounce 
on the theological significance of the latest discovery pertinent to religion. 
Unfortunately, the discipline of theology is often identified with its most 
shrill and narrow-minded exponents, as much by cultural luminaries with an 
antireligious ax to grind as by conservative religious leaders. But the work of 
imaginative intellectuals seeking to integrate the scientific study of religion 
and religious studies into a specifically theological theory of religion per- 
sists quietly around the margins of religiously driven culture wars and in the 
interstices of the socially complex world of theological studies. Such theo- 
logical theories seek to identify not only the origins and functions of religion 
but also the value of religious practices and the truth of religious claims, and 
they seek to do this coherently by uniting every relevant perspective into a 
consistent theory. This is why theology, in this very particular' sense, is the 
most interdisciplinary of all intellectual ventures. 
TWO LEVELS OF DIALOGUE 
T h e  dialogue between scientists, religionists, and theologians over the 
evolution of religious beliefs and behaviors unfolds-or can unfold--on 
two levels. First, at the level of conceptual content, there should be two- 
way traffic between scientific theories and the associated empirical research 
on the one hand and what religionists and theologians say about religious 
beliefs and practices on the other. Most obviously, religious studies and 
theology furnish basic data for the scientific study of religion. The  most 
intellectually well-crafted statements about the beliefs of a religion are 
typically delivered by expert theologians, so scientists studying religion 
should ensure that they know about such statements rather than confining 
themselves to the knowledge base of popular religious self-understand- 
ings. Similarly, the most sophisticated descriptions of religious practices 
come from religionists specializing in ritual studies, so scientists ought 
to take account of them in deciding on the most salient aspects to study 
in detail. Doing this would have an immediate effect on the quality of 
scientific work. Scientists would be far more precise about what they are 
studying-not religious ritual but a particular religious practice and not a 
universal religious belief but an idea found in some parts of some religions 
and not others-and far more cautious about drawing obviously fallacious 
conclusions about religion as a whole from whatever part of religion they 
actually are studying. 
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In the other direction, religionists and theologians ought to have some 
response to emerging scientific theories of the origins of religion, to the 
dawning intelligibility of bizarre religious activities, and to theories of 
cognition that predict the recurrence of supernatural beliefs. Evolutionary 
psychology and cognitive neuroscience should influence theological claims 
about ultimate and proximate realities, salvation and liberation, the mean- 
ing and purpose of life, and how so many human beings come to believe in 
such things. How do theological assertions about sacred religious communi- 
ties comport with the emerging evolutionary account of their origins? Can 
theologians continue to say everything they have formerly said about the 
theological meaning of church and synagogue, temple and sangha? 
The second level of dialogue concerns method. On the one hand, the 
nature and function of theology demand evaluation in light of these results 
from the scientific study of religion. Is theology a socially embedded intel- 
lectual activity specializing in legitimating identity-nurturing deflective and 
projective responses to an uncertain natural environment? Is it a divinely 
given responsibility on behalf of a supernaturally established body of sacred 
revelation? Is it a religiously neutral form of philosophical inquiry? Can it 
be all of these at once? Scientific understandings of religion should impact 
the theologian's perception of what it means to assert and evaluate religious 
truth claims and to operate as the intellectual wing of a religious group and 
thus what it means to function as a theologian. Similarly, the scientific study 
of religion raises sharp questions for religionists about the adequacy of the 
generally humanistic, literary, and historical approaches to the study of reli- 
gion. Does not the scientific study of religion show that these approaches 
need to be complemented-and possibly constrained-by the approaches of 
natural and social scientists? 
On the other hand, the insights of religious studies and theology should 
chasten the scientific study of religion, inhibiting its tendency toward hasty 
and sometimes hostile reductionism in' approaching religious phenomena. 
Religionists and theologians who accept an evolutionary theory of religion 
will inevitably assert that the evolution of human social tendencies and 
higher cognitive capacities provoked and promoted religious behavior. They 
will say that this particular product of the evolutionary process opened up a 
universe of religious depth that would have remained closed otherwise. They 
will picture the existential coloring and religious depth of reality gradually 
becoming a part of the environment of hurnan life as human beings evolved 
the abilities to engage it. This viewpoint makes a virtue of the evolution- 
ary account of the origins and functions of religious beliefs and behaviors. 
Religionists and theologians tend to agree on this much even if theologians 
then go further to speculate on the meaning of all this, whereas religionists 
typically remain content to analyze its functions and effects. The scientist 
studying evolution and religion may not be able to speak to the reality of 
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religious phenomena, but it is dangerous for that scientist simply to refuse to 
consider the role that religious realities may play in conditioning the evolu- 
tionary process itself. 
This presents a serious methodological conundrum for the scientist. The 
scientist does not want to leave out factors relevant to an inquiry about the 
evolutionary origins of religious beliefs and behaviors, yet the scientific 
method appears unable to make use of the hypothesis of the reality of reli- 
gious phenomena be'cause scientific evidence appears incap ble of settling 
such a question. Scientists may be tempted to rule out & reli- 
gious realities a priori rather than remaining neutral to them because they 
are intractable within the scientific framework of analysis. In that case, alert 
religionists and theologians, as well as other scientists, must be ready to 
call the wayward back to the straight-and-narrow path of scientific disci- 
pline. If science cannot settle metaphysical questions about the reality of reli- 
gious objects positively, then neither can it settle such questions negatively. 
Scientists must bracket the questions-in the sense of suspending consider- 
ation of them-and also remain alert to the fact that such bracketing can 
limit the validity of their conclusions. 
ORGANIZATION OF THIS CHAPTER 
Evidently, the potential interactions among the scientific study of reli- 
gion, religious studies, and theology are conceptually and methodologi- 
cally complex, perhaps forbiddingly so. I have sketched these complexities 
with just enough detail to suggest how this volume fits into a wider 
intellectual venture, with a small but growing body of literature. In the 
remainder of this chapter, I shall comment at both the conceptual and the 
methodological level. I shall organize my thoughts into four major sections, 
reflecting the most important themes of the volume: CST, the evolutionary 
status of religion, the cognitive elements of religion, and the adaptive func- 
tions of religion. Sometimes I offer summary overviews or fill in background 
that is missing in the volume, thinking especially of what religionists and 
theologians might need to follow the scientific chapters. But my primary task 
is to say enough on each issue that I can briefly indicate its significance for 
religious studies and theology. 
TERMINOLOGY AND BASIC CONCEPTS 
Throughout this chapter, I take for granted the meaning of several key 
terms in evolutionary biology impinging on evolutionary psychology. Keeping 
these terms in mind is particularly important for religionists and theologians. 
Words such as "fitness" and "adaptiveness" may have misleading connota- 
tions in their worlds of thought, suggesting sound psychological adjustment, 
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empirically accurate interpretation of an environment, health-promoting life- 
styles, or spiritually efficacious beliefs and practices. As important as these 
ideas are for understanding religion, they should not be conflated with the 
differential reproduction advantage associated with the concepts of fitness 
and adaptive function in evolutionary biology. 
Fitness always refers to reproductive fitness, which means the ability of a 
biological entity (organism) to pass genetic information (genes) to future gen- 
erations. This refers not to the number of offspring (which may be infertile 
or die before they reproduce, after all) but to the spread of genetic material 
in future generations. A simple (but not foolproof) test of fitness is whether 
one's offspring themselves are reproductively successful. Fitness is always 
relevant to an environment, within which a population has a niche where it is 
subject to particular selection pressures in the form of nutrition, disease, and 
predators. A key question in evolutionary biology is whether the environ- 
ment relevant to fitness can include high-level social factors as well as low- 
level biological factors. Evolutionary psychology's core hypothesis is that 
social and psychological factors are relevant to evolutionary fitness. 
A trait is a genetically based characteristic of an organism, such as eye 
color or  a genetic propensity to cancer. I will use characteristic or feature 
to refer to aspects of an organism's behavior and function in general. The  
genetic basis of traits is an extremely complex matter because genes often 
influence more than one characteristic of an organism and traits usually 
depend on many interacting genes. Unresolved questions about the genetic 
basis of organism characteristics abound, particularly in the context of evo- 
lutionary psychology, where the concern is with emergent characteristics 
such as behaviors, emotions, and beliefs. Many behavioral characteristics can 
be cultivated independently of genetic makeup, so it is frequently unclear 
whether certain behavioral features of organisms are traits in the genetic 
sense at all. T o  say that a behavioral predisposition is a trait implies that the 
behavioral predisposition has a genetic basis that somehow persists through 
cultural and contextual factors and tends to express the associated behavior 
in widely varying circumstances. Twin studies and adoption studies can help 
to decide whether a behavior has a genetic component and thus whether 
the associated behavioral tendency is a trait. In human evolution, most key 
traits were developed in the very long Pleistocene environment of evolution- 
ary adaptation, a hunter-gatherer lifestyle prior to settled agriculture 
I shall refer as the ancestral environment. 
p a t  
A mutation is a structural and molecular chemical change in genetic 
material. Many mutations are irrelevant to  an organism's function, at least 
in the short term, though presumably many unexpected things can happen 
in gene evolution in the long term. The  sorts of mutations we are inter- 
ested in produce or affect traits. In evolutionary psychology, the focus is 
on mutations that affect cognitive and behavioral traits. An adaptation is 
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a mutation o r  a set of mutations that increases individual fitness. Genetic 
change is adaptive for apopulation when it produces traits that increase the 
population's average fitness. 
Fitness is a relative term, expressing differential reproduction advantage of 
one organism relative to others of the same species in the same environment 
or average differential reproduction advantage of one population relative to a 
similar population at a different time or place or in a changed environment. 
There is no absolute measure of fitness. A niche is the ecological setting for a 
species of organisms and determines the part of the wider environment that is 
causally relevant to the species' fitness. A niche resonance is a self-reinforcing 
match between an adaptive trait and an environment that increases both the 
frequency of the trait in the population and the fitness of organisms possessing 
the trait. A niche resonance can link genetically distinct traits in such a way 
that the frequency of both traits increases in the population. This is especially 
important in sexual reproduction, where a male trait and a female trait can 
reinforce one another and increase in frequency within the population even 
though neither trait alone would increase fitness. Niche resonances can even 
occur between species, particularly in communicative environments that permit 
the sending and receiving of signals between predators and prey. Evolutionary 
psychology proposes that niche resonances might also sponsor gene-cultun 
coevolution, a hypothetical relation between organisms and environment in 
which genetically linked cultural practices have a genetic influence. 
Adaptive function refers to the biological or behavioral function of a 
genetic trait that causes it to be adaptive. A trait that decreases fitness has a 
maladaptive function; selection pressures may reduce the presence of such 
traits in the population. A genetic feature can be neither adaptive nor mal- 
adaptive if no selection pressure exists in a particular context to affect its 
presence in the population. The question of the context for assessing adap 
tive function and maladaptive function is a vexed one in evolutionary psy- 
chology. The original selection context is that in which a trait first becomes 
established in one or more organisms within the ancestral environment and 
then spreads widely through the species because of its adaptive function in 
that context. An established trait can also have effects other than theprimary 
adaptive function for which it was selected. These effects, whether copresent 
already in the original selection context or appearing only much later as 
environmental conditions change and new traits are established, are called 
side eflects or by-products. When by-product effects serve to increase fitness 
independently of the primary adaptive function, the underlying trait has a 
secondary adaptive function. As with primary adaptive function, there can be 
secondary maladaptive functions and secondary functions that are neither adap 
tive nor nonadaptive, or nonfunctional by-products. 
Traits adaptive in one context can become maladaptive in a new context. 
By-products can be simultaneously adaptive, maladaptive, and nonfunctional 
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with respect to different selection mechanisms. There is great deal of dynamism 
here as varying sets of traits interact with diverse environments. Evolutionary 
psychology proposes that culturally conditioned behaviors can combine with 
genetic traits to have genetically relevant effects, as when health care policies 
and technologies create reproductive opportunities for those who would not 
have been able to reproduce in the ancestral environment. Sexual selection, the 
process of mate choice, is particularly important in giving genetic relevance to 
culturally conditioned aspects of organisms. Communicative environments vastly 
expand the range and likelihood of trait side effects. Some may be potentially 
maladaptive, as when communication allows human beings to wipe out malaria 
in some parts of the world, thereby reducing the presence of malaria resistant 
genes and exposing larger numbers of people to a future outbreak of deadly 
malaria under new environmental conditions. Most side effects are not directly 
exposed to selection pressures, as when human beings flip coins, cook waffles, 
and play cricket. 
Different types of evolutionary theorists tend to focus on different 
contexts. Some focus on the original context for a trait's selection, some 
on the long-term persistence of traits through varied environments, and 
some on the current observable adaptive function of traits. This leads to 
quite different conceptual and terminological frameworks and sometimes 
to a great deal of confusion. Miscommunication can be mitigated by pay- 
ing attention to the question of context for claims about the adaptiveness 
of traits. As it happens, diverse terminological frameworks are evident 
in the chapters of this volume, particularly around signaling theory and 
evolutionary by-products. When we come to those topics, therefore, I shall 
return. to terminological and conceptual clarification in an attempt to pro- 
mote mutual understanding. 
COSTLY S I G N A L I N G  T H E O R Y  A N D  R E L I G I O N  
Most of the chapters in this volume accept the promise of costly signaling 
theory (CST) to offer an explanation of bizarre, seemingly fitness-reducing, 
and otherwise hard-to-explain behavioral characteristics, including certain 
religious phenomena. CST seems to apply only to some aspects of religion, 
and thus its usefulness as an explanation of religion's evolutionary origins is 
hard to assess with any confidence. Moreover, CST is controversial even in 
its native domain, as we shall see later in this chapter. Yet CST also suggests 
that costly religious behaviors can no longer serve as evidence that religion 
lacks an evolutionary origin. On the contrary, CST explains how such coun- 
terintuitive behaviors might actually increase fitness in communicative envi- 
ronments. Since there is no systematic accounting of the CST controversy in 
the current volume, a sketch of the main issues is in order here before turn- 
ing to its application to religion. 
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A Sketch of the Development of Costly Signaling Theory 
In a famous 1975 paper, biologist Amotz Zahavi introduced the handicap 
principle (Zahavi 1975, 1977a, 1977b). Inspired by his long observations of 
small Arabian Babbler birds, Zahavi was trying to explain how apparently 
fitness-reducing handicaps could evolve. In the realm of sexual selection, a 
standard example is the weighty and florid plumage of some male peafowls 
(peacocks). Such plumage might be sexually appealing to female peafowls 
(peahens), but it is metabolically expensive to produce, tiring to lift and 
spread, and increases the peacock's vulnerability to predators. The male trait 
thus seems to decrease fitness. The corresponding female trait also seems to 
decrease fitness by limiting the number of eligible mates. This doesn't make 
much sense on the premises of natural selection alone, so how could such an 
arrangement have evolved? In the interspecies realm, a standard example is 
gazelle stotting. When a gazelle notices a lion stalking in the savanna grass, 
the gazelle starts leaping in place, high in the air. Should not the gazelle save 
its valuable energy for running away and make the most of its time by start- 
ing immediately? For its part, the lion tends to avoid high-stotting gazelles 
and go after low-stotting or no-stotting gazelles instead. 
Zahavi's key move in explaining such phenomena was to hypothesize a 
communicative environment, within which evolutionarily relevant signals can be 
sent from sijpalers to receivers so as to influence receiver behavior. The pea- 
- 
cock's plumage is a trait that "sends a message" about genetic value (in the 
sense of likely reproductive fitness of offspring), while the peahen's instinc- 
tive attraction to florid plumage is a trait that permits her to "receive the 
message" about genetic value, which influences her mate-selection behavior. 
The two traits together in the right environment create a niche resonance 
that increases the frequency of exorbitant plumage in males and the fre- 
quency of attraction to such plumage in females. Males may die sooner, but 
they will find mates more quickly and more often (peacocks are polygynous 
in the wild and only monogamous in captivity), so their overall reproductive 
fitness may in fact increase, contrary to initial expectations. Females will 
have fewer potential mates, yet their overall fitness may increase because of 
increased fitness of their offspring. 
Zahavi's intuitive (though not experimental) causal explanation of 
such behaviors promised an analytical framework for understanding their 
evolutionary origins and significance. At the time when Zahavi made his 
proposal, the most broadly accepted theory was Ronald Fisher's runaway 
sexual selection explanation (Fisher, 1930). Fisher proposed that there are 
no selection pressures (apart from peahen mate selection) on peacocks with 
large plumages, so the trait is amplified in the population without limit 
so long as peahens are attracted to such plumage. Surely runaway sexual 
selection applies in many cases, but the handicap principal is superior in 
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the case of peafowl because it accommodates the fact that plumage varies 
tremendously among peacocks. This variation presumably allows it to be 
used as a reliable fitness signal. 
Gazelle stotting can also be explained on the premise of communica- 
tion between gazelle and lion. The speculative reconstruction of this com- 
munication is as follows. The gazelle uses up valuable energy, but it shows 
the lion how strong and fast it must be through the height of its leaping. 
A lion smart enough to get that message but not smart enough to realize 
that gazelles with longest-lasting stotting displays may be more exhausted 
and easier to catch will chase down nonleaping or lower-leaping gazelles. 
This helps the lion because a failed chase is extremely exhausting, making a 
subsequent chase even less likely to succeed and risking starvation. It helps 
the individual gazelle by deflecting the predator's attention to weak or sick 
animals. At the gazelle population level, this deflection costs nothing in aver- 
age fitness if the killed animal is old. It may actually improve average fitness 
if the unlucky prey is genetically prone to weakness. The resulting niche 
resonance increases the frequency of both the stotting trait in the gazelle 
population and the cognitive inference trait in the lion population. The care- 
ful scientist immediately wonders whether this story can ever really be con- 
firmed or even experimentally tested because it depends on the cognitive 
contents of animal minds. 
These explanations of seemingly fitness-reducing traits make evolution- 
ary sense only if the signals in question are reliable indicators of reproduc- 
tive fitness. Why? Suppose it turns out that low-leaping gazelles can actually 
run faster and dodge better than high-leaping gazelles. The lion that chases 
low-leaping gazelles, thinking they are more vulnerable, is less likely to eat. 
Its fitness is reduced by its possession of this mistaken cognitive structure, 
and the frequency of that trait will decrease in the lion population accord- 
ingly. Correspondingly, the high-stotting trait offers no survival advantage 
for gazelles to offset the disadvantage of exhaustion when lions do not treat 
stotting as a reliable signal of strength and speed. In this case, the stot- 
ting trait is not relevant to reproductive fitness, so it cannot function as an 
authentic signal and would not become an evolutionarily stable feature of the 
gazelle-lion-savanna environmental niche. 
Zahavi's proposal was not received warmly at first. Evolutionary biolo- 
gists from John Maynard Smith (1976) and Richard Dawkins (1976) to 
Robert Trivers (1985) and Mark Kirkpatrick (1986) criticized it because it 
flies in the face of the principle of natural selection, had no theoretical justi- 
fication in the familiar terms of game theory, relied on very little data, and 
seemed to oversimplify animal signaling phenomena. Whereas natural selec- 
tion eliminates fitness-reducing traits, the handicap principle can amplify 
them. Explanations of strange biological phenomena are welcome, of course, 
particularly when such phenomena make little sense on the principle of 
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natural selection alone, but the theoretical confusion induced by conflicting 
principles at the heart of biological evolution was not welcome. In fact, the 
problem of conflicting principles in evolutionary biology is long-standing. 
Darwin himself had distinguished the principle of sexual selection from the 
principle of natural selection and had produced no fully satisfying synthesis 
(see Darwin, 1859, 1872). This suggests that the difficulty accepting Zahavi's 
speculative interpretations of his observations may have been driven in some 
cases by a selection-oriented orthodoxy in biology that was not nearly as 
empirically minded as Darwin himself was. 
The handicap principle is far more general than Darwin's sexual selec- 
tion principle because it may help to explain surprising phenomena in sib- 
ling competition, predator-prey communication, and a variety of other 
contexts (see Zahavi & Zahavi, 1997). It  is really about how the principle of 
natural selection needs to be modified to accommodate the fact of emergent 
- 
communicative contexts. Fitness remains the evolutionary yardstick, but in com- 
municative environments natural selection is only one of many possible algorithms 
for optimizingJitness. 
Alan Grafen's landmark 1990 paper confirmed this interpretation of the 
handicap principle with game-theoretic formality that was alien to Zahavi's 
more intuitive observational work (see Grafen, 1990). Gafen's mathemati- 
cal model showed how handicaps, understood as a kind of costly signaling, 
could optimize fitness in evolutionarily stable ways. The model also clearly 
exposed the assumptions of the handicap principle, allowing evolutionary 
biologists to see how it could complement the principle of natural selection. 
Grafen's work helped to win broad acceptance of the handicap principle 
among experts in the field. Some early critics reversed their early judgments 
(see Dawkins 1989), while others sought to generalize animal signaling 
theory to include the possibility of noncostly signals as well as the costly 
signals of the handicap principle (see Maynard Smith & Harper, 2003). With 
Grafen's contribution, the idea of handicap traits making sense in communi- 
cative environments had taken a huge step toward theoretical stability, and 
what we now know as CST was born. 
Contemporary critics of CST have isolated weaknesses and oversimpli- 
fications in CST-based modeling. They point out that real-world relation- 
ships are multifaceted and cannot be reduced to the simple roles of CST 
game-theoretic models; that the actual genetic relevance of signals is often 
assumed rather than shown; that the models rarely accommodate dynamic 
complexities due to the social realities of cheating and deception, memory, 
and reputation; and that the game-theoretic criterion of evolutionarily stable 
scenarios oversimplifies the fluidity of evolutionary environments and the 
endlessly complex relationships that animals form within them. Yet because 
of the success of the handicap principle in solving some classic problems in 
evolutionary biology, scientists have tried to apply CST to other phenomena 
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that they find difficult to explain. In the biological sciences, it is an important 
factor in theories of sexual selection, kin relationships, and predator-prey 
behaviors. In the human sciences, it appears in theories of class distinctions, 
conspicuous consumption, fashion trends, adolescent peer-group dynamics, 
deception, language development, and ritual. Anthropologists and psycholo- 
gists use CST to explain dangerous or  bizarre human behaviors that reduce 
individual fitness, from needless risk taking to painful rituals and from 
altruistic acts of sacrifice to exorbitant acts of public generosity. Despite 
the ongoing challenges to CST, therefore, it appears to be here to stay. The 
core idea that communicative environments change the way environmental- 
species niches optimize evolutionary fitness corrects selection-focused biol- 
ogy by pointing out that complex emergent communicative environments 
permit many novel pathways to increasing fitness. 
While experts now agree that costly signals are among the signaling 
phenomena that can be evolutionarily relevant, it is important to ask why 
costly signals turn out to be important in a given case when there are so 
many other potentially relevant dimensions of signaling, such as the com- 
municative capacities involved in noncostly cooperation behaviors. In other 
words, if noncostly signals can enhance evolutionary fitness, why would 
costly signals ever arise? This is not a difficult question to answer, in princi- 
ple: costly signals may be able to solve some problems that noncostly signals 
cannot, such as the freeloader (or free-rider) problem discussed in several 
places in this volume. But it is extremely important to keep this question 
in mind because game-theoretic models often suggest that non-CST equi- 
libria persist alongside CST equilibria for biological signaling systems. In 
order to be credible, therefore, a CST-based analysis of a behavioral trait 
probably has to show that explanations based on noncostly signaling do not 
rule out a role for costly signals. But this level of rigorous argumentation 
is hard to achieve because evolutionary biology presumes communicative 
environments that we cannot inspect but only imaginatively reconstruct. 
The speculation that inevitably results makes it difficult to determine why, 
given that every imaginable kind and variation of signaling seems to have 
a role in evolution, one kind of signaling rather than another seems to have 
paid off in a particular evolutionary niche. 
A similar frustration concerns the struggle for terminologcal consistency 
and conceptual clarity in this area. The chapters in this volume sometimes 
use different words for similar concepts and the same words for quite distinct 
concepts, thereby reproducing in microcosm the problem plaguing signaling 
theory as a whole. As just one example, Sosis uses the word "index" and its 
cognates such as "indicator" in multiple ways. Sometimes he uses it to describe 
a causal type of sign, as in his claim that behaviors, badges, and bans "indexi- 
cally signal" (i.e., functionally signal because causally related to) acceptance of 
a community's moral norms. In this usage, an index or indicator is a sign that 
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is causally related to that about which it communicates. Other times he uses it 
to mean a suggestion, as when he says that fakable signals can still be useful 
"indicators" of belief. In this usage, an index or indicator increases the prob- 
ability that an observer's assumption about sincerity will be correct. Sosis 
needs both ideas but has only one term. 
Maynard Smith and Harper (2003) directly address the terminological 
and conceptual problems of signaling theory. They offer a conceptually well- 
organized survey of animal signaling and propose sharp definitions aimed 
at eliminating confusions and stabilizing language used to frame theories of 
signaling. They also situate CST-type explanations in the broader context of 
animal signaling, allowing us to see how CST can complement other lines 
of explanation for behavioral traits. Without a conceptually adequate and 
consistent lexicon of key terms, entering the world of thought of a particular 
author is a stiff challenge for outsiders and may lead to misunderstandings 
and conceptual muddles even among specialist readers. 
Through all these complexities, several points emerge forcefully. First, 
communicative environments entune the range of fitness-enhancing evolu- 
tionary strategies, permitting fitness-reducing behaviors to persist in partic- 
ular species-environment niches. The natural selection filter in its simplest 
form seems to serve as an indispensable foundation for more elaborate strate- 
gies, such as animal signaling phenomena. Second, signaling theory helps to 
shift the focus in evolutionary biology from selection to fitness, which is to 
move attention from one strategy to the overarching end served by all strat- 
egies. It does this by linking the principle of natural selection with sexual 
selection, the handicap principle, cooperation, altruism, reputation, and other 
communication-based modes of analysis into a more comprehensive theo- 
retical approach to evolutionary fitness. This promises to resolve the tension 
between apparently conflicting evolutionary principles that has persisted in 
biology since Darwin's writings. Third, if we allow that a species can become 
genetically predisposed to certain behaviors within an evolutionary niche, 
then we also have to allow that those behavioral predispositions may per- 
sist in the population even when the niche disappears and the environment 
changes radically. This can lead to "fish out of water" behaviors that, while 
expected in the original selection environment, may seem bizarre in a new 
environment, perhaps because they continue to involve costly signaling 
when the conditions for overall increase in fitness of a costly signal no lon- 
ger obtain. This in turn invites explanations of seemingly needlessly costly 
or otherwise bizarre human behaviors in terms of genetic conditioning. 
A CST of  Religion (Sosis) 
With this quick survey in place, we come to religion. Several chapters in 
this volume assert that CST can help to make sense of a number of human 
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behaviors present in what we now call religion. Pinker mentions CST as an 
explanatory framework that might make sense of costly religious initiations 
and sacrifices. Emmons and McNamara use CST to interpret the pervasive- 
ness of certain sacred emotions in religion. Koenig and Bouchard mention 
CST as one possible factor in the emergence of religiousness in the ancestral 
environment. Bulbulia accepts CST as the framework for understanding how 
religion facilitates group commitment and uses this to enhance and correct 
McClenon's ritual healing thesis that religion evolved because it promotes 
health-increasing placebo benefits. Atran uses CST to explain how religion, 
though not an adaptation itself, functions adaptively as a solution to ever- 
present existential problems of death and deception. Sosis devotes his entire 
chapter to explaining how CST illumines the evolution of religious beliefs 
and practices. 
The general pattern of the reasoning seems to go something like this. 
As outsiders we can observe religious behaviors that strike us as strange 
because they seem to reduce fitness (e.g., Bulbulia's cognitive error associ- 
ated with religious beliefs) or because they cause pain (e.g., Sosis's agonizing 
and terrifying religious rites)--of course, we also observe that these behav- 
iors make perfect sense to insiders. We reason that the counterintuitive, 
excessively painful, or fitness-reducing character of these behaviors means 
that they would not arise spontaneously in a social group unless there were 
genetic predispositions to perform them. Consequently, we assume the pres- 
ence of such genetic predispositions-and in some cases there is evidence, as 
some of the chapters recount, especially Emmons and McNamara, Koenig 
and Bouchard, and Bering. But we do not assume that there is a specific 
genetic tendency to penis laceration (as described by Sosis) because this is 
not widespread enough in the species to be an innate tendency expressing a 
trait. Rather, we assume that there is a genetic tendency to tolerate and seek 
such behaviors that expresses itself with wide variations in ways specific to 
culture and circumstance. Some of these behaviors may align strongly with 
religious rituals, while others may not. After this, we seek to understand 
precisely what these deeper genetic predispositions are, why they are reli- 
giously linked when they are, and how they were formed in the ancestral 
environment. 
Sosis's chapter marshals an impressive array of evidence both that reli- 
gion at least sometimes involves costly signaling and that costly signaling 
can help to explain the origins and persistence of some features of religion. 
His leading questions are excellent: Given the near ubiquity of costly behav- 
iors, why do we spend so much time and energy on them? What is the evolu- 
tionarily point? And why do costly behaviors vary so dramatically in nature 
and intensity? 
Sosis begins with an excruciating description of the torture of boys and 
young men among the Ilahita Arapesh, galvanizing readers' attention by 
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challenging their moral norms in the way that only anthropologists can- 
they do this, one suspects, with secret self-congratulatory flourishes of plea- 
sure as they picture their readers' discomfort. But such is life, apparently. 
Sosis intends his illustration to be a thought-provoking example of the prob- 
lem he seeks to address. He then frames the problem in religious terms as 
if he had just been describing instances of religious rituals. But the connec- 
tion between penis laceration and religion is nowhere established, as it is, 
for example, in a very different form in circumcision. This would be a minor 
point except that the fuzzy boundary between religious and nonreligious rit- 
uals-evident elsewhere in the chapter, tow-endangers the heart of Sosis's 
argument. If we focus on costly religious rituals, we tend to ask about the 
evolution of religion. But if the relevant evolved traits underlie costly rituals 
in general and not specifically costly religious rituals, then we will not suc- 
ceed in throwing much clear light on the evolutionary origins of religion by 
studying costly rituals. So when Sosis analyzes the communicative content 
of religious behaviors, badges, and bans, it is fair to ask what the evolution- 
ary rationale is for limiting the scope of the question to religion and whether 
this way of framing the issue distorts the resulting accounts both of human 
nature and of religion. 
It is not difficult to see how theoretical distortion might occur. Our the- 
ory of the communicative content of religious behaviors, badges, and bans 
may lead us to propose that religion evolved specifically to promote such 
signaling. Indeed, Sosis plausibly argues that religion promotes reliable sig- 
nals better than simply announcing promises, but he merely assumes the 
superiority of religion to all other social mechanisms for establishing signal 
reliability without offering good reasons to think it is so. What if promise 
making was accompanied by some costly, nonreligious ritual, such as offer- 
ing up one's children as a guarantee of sincerity? Indeed, this has happened, 
as when a slave makes such a suggestion to reassure a master that he or she 
will return from a journey. Less potentially deadly forms of collateral are 
common in financial transactions. The result would be a nonreligious cul- 
- 
tural practice highly conducive to truth telling, promise keeping, and reliable 
signaling. The relevant trait is a cognitive one: we need to be able to count 
on a promise in spite of our ability to deceive and in spite of our theory of other 
minds that allows us to imagine being deceived. But those cognitive traits 
could promote many sorts of costly ritual practices, even if they were not 
religious in any recognizable sense. Therefore, we would err if we saw here a 
reason for the evolution of religion. W e  have only a reason for the evolution 
of behavioral traits wppe&q costly rituals that support reliable signaling. 
The question of the role of religion in such rituals-and the reasons for its 
absence in some-is not directly answered in such arguments. 
Sosis addresses this difficultly later in his chapter. He wisely notes that 
religion is much more than costly rituals supporting reliable signaling that 
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can solve group-bonding problems. It also includes myths and mystical 
experiences, beliefs and emotions. He focuses on religious beliefs in super- 
natural agents, the effects of internalizing such beliefs, and their emotional 
significance. He argues that internalized beliefs in supernatural agents 
expose one's private intentions to a supernatural being capable of seeing and 
punishing deception. Such beliefs thus function as an internal goad to hon- 
est signaling. Religious practices, as Sosis points out, cause participants to 
internalize such beliefs through ritualized repetition and emotional priming. 
And most religious communities back up these mechanisms for internalizing 
group norms with an array of punishments, beginning with disapproval and 
fines and running through public shaming and physical beatings all the way 
to banishment, excommunication, torture, and execution. 
In this way, Sosis argues that religion evolved as a means of maximizing 
the reliability of signals in socially complex communicative contexts. But 
he leaves open the question about whether the underlying traits are tightly 
tied to religion or rather promote quite general features of human behavior 
that influence the evolution of religion along with other loci of ritualized 
behavior and belief He hints at part of the reason for this open-endedness 
at the end of his chapter. T o  Sosis-and I think this is commendablethe 
practical problems associated with religious beliefs and practices are much 
more important than reconstructing their evolutionary origins. Yet if we are 
to apply a CST-based theory (or indeed any other evolutionary theory of reli- 
gion) to contemporary problems, it is best to have our theoretical ducks in a 
row. Knowing what sort of story our theory implies at the trait level serves 
as a check on theoretical adventurousness and may even help to avoid the 
covert operation of bias in our social and political analyses. 
The Import of Costly Signaling for Religious Studies 
and Theology 
The significance of CST for religious studies and theology is obvious: if 
CST is correct, then religious studies and theology have been overlooking 
something vital. 
This hits home in religious studies, particularly within ritual theory, a 
fascinating and complex interdisciplinary area of study involving many 
lines of investigation. I t  involves historical investigation about the origins 
of rituals and their changes over time as well as description of the varied 
cultural expressions of similar rituals-themes less likely to be impacted 
by CST. But ritual theorists also try to explain the social and religious 
functions of rituals. The main resources here come from theoretically ori- 
ented sociologists and anthropologists who have proposed wide-ranging 
frameworks for understanding human behavior. Unfortunately, most of 
the theoretical frameworks in play within ritual theory do not discuss 
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evolutionary psychology and certainly not CST. As a result, many inter- 
pretations of costly religious rituals are currently leaving out a potentially 
field-transforming insight. 
CST also deeply challenges theological readings of costly rituals. A theo- 
logian typically tries to make sense of the particular rituals that predominate 
in a single religious tradition as expressed in a particular place and time, 
being careful to take account of historical developments and the deliverances 
of sacred texts and traditional wisdom. Some theological interpretations 
of rituals ignore ritual theory altogether and work intensively within the 
plausibility structures and resources of a local religious tradition. Neither 
CST nor ritual studies are likely to induce such theologians to raise their 
eyes and consider "external" theoretical interpretations of ritual. By con- 
trast, other theologians attempt to forge interpretations of the theological 
significance of ritual while absorbing the best theoretical understandings 
of ritual in general. Such theologians will be fascinated by CST, regardless 
of their tradition of focus or their religion of affiliation, if they have one. 
For them, CST raises the question of whether theological interpretations of 
ritual nurtured within religious communities are compatible with evolution- 
- 
ary psychology's insights into the function of rituals in human groups. What 
happens to the theological interpretation of shamanic self-flagellation and 
the Hajj's dangerous crowd-crushing stoning-the-devil ritual or of ancestor 
reverence and the pouring out of precious milk in Hindu puja when CST is 
drawn into the interpretation? Theologians inclined to say that Jewish cir- 
cumcision expresses a covenant between God and God's chosen people may 
look at the origins of the rite, which was among grown men, quite differently 
in the light of CST. CST may also help theologians used to thinking of the 
Christian Eucharist as a means of participating in the saving benefits ofJesus 
Christ's sacrificial death to look on the historical origins and early social sig- 
nificance of the Eucharist in new and potentially revolutionary ways. 
Finally, theologians interested in the theological meaning and social sig- 
nificance of religious groups need to scrutinize their working interpretative 
frameworks in the light of evolutionary psychology and CST in particular. 
The sorts of social functions that CST speaks of-such as solving the free- 
loader problem and increasing the reliability of commitment signals-are 
rarely mentioned in theological interpretations of religious groups, yet these 
kinds of dynamics may be among the most important factors influencing 
their origins and function. 
T H E  EVOLUTIONARY S T A T U S  O F  R E L I G I O N  
A prominent theme in this volume is the evolutionary status of religion. 
Is religion an evolutionary adaptation, increasing fitness in and of itself and 
originating because of its adaptive function? Is it a side effect of a collection 
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of adapted traits, much as language and war and commerce seem to be? Is it a 
nonadapted by-product of the evolutionary process, like the redness of blood, 
or perhaps a maladaptive by-product, such as back problems that derive from 
erect posture? Is it possible that religion has no genetic component at all, 
either in its unfathomable origins or in its subsequent cultural expressions? 
These questions lie at the heart of the interpretation of religion within evo- 
lutionary psychology, and some of them are quite significant for religionists 
and theologians, as we shall see. 
Religion as Nongenetic 
We might be tempted to think there is no genetic component to religion, 
despite its near universality among human beings, because we can find no 
way to account for the diversity of religious practices and beliefs in terms 
of genetic traits. Rather, on this view, we should understand religion as a 
culture-level response to social needs for bonding and legitimation, to the 
problems of deception and freeloading, and to primal experiences of tran- 
scendence, revelation, love, and death. Religion is diverse because cultural 
practices are genetically underdetermined, leaving lots of room for chance 
0 * factordto condition the particular practices of a given group. Religion recurs 
across cultures and eras for the same reason that fire does: it is an effective 
way to deal with the common challenges. We  need presuppose no genetic 
tendency to either religion or fire. How credible is this nongenetic interpre- 
tation of religion? 
The classic modern sources for the scientific study of religion include 
early philosophical and theological theorists such as Immanuel Kant and 
Georg Hegel, early sociologists such as h mile Durkheim and Max Weber, 
early psychologists such as Sigmund Freud and Carl Jung, and early cross- 
over intellectuals such as William James. It is vital to note that these field- 
defining religionists worked by and large out of the nongenetic framework 
for understanding religion that I have just sketched. To  a very large extent, 
the nongenetic framework for interpreting religion continues to dominate 
religious studies today. For example, few religious studies programs offer 
courses in the evolutionary psychology of religion. 
In many ways, this does not matter much. To  study the peculiar changes 
that crept into Buddhism when it migrated eastward from India into China, 
historians work closely with documentary sources. They can do that without 
paying any attention to evolutionary psychology if they confine themselves 
to description of the changes, surely a difficult enough challenge. Yet changes 
in religious beliefs on such migrations might well be affected by genetically 
based cognitive structures that constrain the options for how given beliefs are 
reframed in a new cultural context. If the historian is interested in explaining 
the changes rather than just describing them-and most historians do have 
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such interests-then the evolutionary psychology of religion claims a place 
in the discussion. 
Such thought experiments challenge prevailing assumptions in reli- 
gious studies that religion is a nongenetic, culture-level phenomenon or 
that its genetic linkages are irrelevant to understanding it. The chap- 
ters in this volume (especially Bering and Koenig and Bouchard) recount 
seemingly robust evidence that some aspects of religiosity have a genetic 
component. So religionists need to start paying attention to evolutionary 
theories of religion on pain of irrelevance. But irrelevance cuts both ways. 
From the point of view of even the most elementary religious studies, the 
lack of nuance in evolutionary theories of religion is appalling and makes 
the affected scientific work irrelevant for understanding religion as such, 
which in turn compromises its usefulness even for understanding a single 
dissociated feature of religion. 
The disconnect between evolutionary theories of religion and mainstream 
religious studies is quite profound and must be overcome not only for the 
sake of theoretical adequacy but also to improve the quality of public dis- 
course about religion. A scientist studying a single feature of religion may 
not have the broad-based knowledge needed to properly appreciate manifold 
levels of value in religious phenomena. T o  have such a person speak in pub- 
lic about a religious controversy can be disastrously insensitive and poten- 
tially insulting to adherents of a religion. In fact, we saw unsophisticated 
punditry from scientists repeatedly in the widespread controversy over the 
September 30, 2005, Danish publication-and subsequent republication in 
more than fifty other countries-of caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad. 
I t  is religious studies specialists who best understand religions and their 
internal and external battles. Yet the evolutionary study of religion casts 
many contemporary religious controversies into a fascinating and informa- 
tive light that may eventually help to explain group identity struggles better 
than sociology alone. The quality of public discourse about religion demands 
that if hard scientists are not going to learn religious studies, then some reli- 
gious studies specialists need to overcome their "genetics does not matter" 
mentality and seek to learn about the evolutionary interpretation of religion 
and the brain. 
Religion as an Adaptation 
On the spectrum of theories about the evolutionary status of religion, the 
view that religion is an evolutionary adaptation lies at the opposite end from 
the nongenetic view. The adaptation uplanation says both that genetic predis- 
positions to specifically religious beliefs and behaviors increased average fit- 
ness in the ancestral environment and that the primary adaptive functions of 
these beliefs and behaviors are precisely what caused the genetic predispositions 
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orignally to become well established-and eventually virtually ubiquitous-in 
the human population. 
This is a bold claim, considering that we cannot inspect the ancestral 
environment to check its accuracy. But perhaps we are not totally confined 
to speculative reconstructions of how things went down in the savanna. 
~da i ta t ion is t s  assume that the beliefs and behaviors associated with reli- 
gion-inducing traits were expressed in ancestral environments in ways simi- 
lar to today. This assumption is implausible if we think the challenges that 
originally provoked religious beliefs and behaviors no longer obtain. But it is 
plausible if we have reason to believe that those behaviors solved similar evo- 
lutionary challenges consistently across evolutionary contexts. In that case, 
we can indirectly inspect the original selection context by directly examining 
religious beliefs and behaviors in the contemporary world. Research on the 
evolutionary origins of religion as an adaptation can then be accomplished by 
studying how tightly connected religious beliefs and behaviors are to genetic 
traits in the current context. This involves twin and adoption studies to iso- 
late genetic from environmental contributions to religious belief and behav- 
ior. It also increasingly involves neurological and biochemical studies. But it 
is crucial for the adaptationist's case that the relevant genetic traits induce 
specifically religious beliefs and underlie specifically religious practices-as 
against other, nonreligious beliefs and practices that might play a role in 
solving social problems among savanna hunter-gatherers. 
In this way, we might try to construct the evidential foundations for a 
theory of the evolution of religion as an adaptation: relipon rides on the 
back of specifically religious beliefs and behaviors that are tightly linked 
to genetic traits, with the traits selected for by virtue of the problem- 
solving usefulness of the associated beliefs and behaviors. Around this core of 
- 
belief-inducing and behavior-promoting genetic traits, there may be a com- 
plex accretion of side-effect behaviors and cognitive tendencies that are not 
as tightly linked to genes and therefore can account for the massive variation 
in religious expression across cultures and eras. The adaptive functions of 
core religious beliefs and behaviors would produce structural similarities in 
all religious phenomena, however, and perhaps even specific religious beliefs 
and behaviors that are universal or nearly universal across the wealth of 
religious expressions. On this view, we could and should define religion in 
terms of these core genetically linked behaviors. (Startlingly, we have here 
the promise of a relatively objective solution to the religionist's unending 
problem of trying to define religion.) 
The adaptation explanation is helpfully vulnerable to correction. Simply 
look for evidence of structural factors that persist through religious phe- 
nomena. Religionists have discovered few such universal factors, and most 
that have been discovered seem not to be distinctively tied to religion but 
rather seem to be generic features of human cultural activity. This weighs 
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against the adaptationist explanation of religion. But perhaps religionists 
have not been looking in the right places or for the right things. Cooperation 
between evolutionary theorists and specialists in the study of religion might 
turn up stronger evidence to support the adaptationist case. 
I believe that relatively few theorists explicitly defend in print the idea that 
religion as a whole or in large part is a genetic adaptation. Yet many evolution- 
ary psychologists attack adaptationism as if this view had a lot of supporters 
and they were causing a lot of trouble. Perhaps this is a vengeful expression 
of frustration that the adaptationist line is so easy for the general public to 
grasp that oversimplified adaptationist views, rather then their more complex 
competitors, typically make the front pages of newsmagazines and television 
documentaries. The title of Dean Hamer's (2004) book says everything we need 
to know about the popular cachet of adaptationist readings of religion: T h  God 
Gem: How Faith Is Hardwired into Our Genes. Even when books do not argue 
explicitly for religion as an adaptation, publishers often insist on oversimpli- 
fied titles that suggest the eminently comprehensible adaptationist position, 
as in Matthew Alper's (2001) T h  "God" Part of t h  Brain, which comes com- 
plete with the neurological modularist's favorite sort of image on the cover: a 
brain scan with a small patch lit up (presumably with spiritual illumination). 
A similar adaptationist oversimplification happened in the press's reception 
of V. S. Ramachandran's work on a temporal lobe brain area that seems con- 
nected to religious experiences, reportedly to Ramachandran's great dismay 
(see Ramachandran, 2004; Ramachandran & Blakeslee, 1998). 
Hamer is more cautious than his many critics often allow, but he does 
seem to want to argue for religion as an adaptation, so it is worth noting the 
weakness of his argument (Hamer is aware of the difficulty but risks it for 
the sake of speculatively articulating a bold hypothesis). He claims to find a 
correlation between a point mutation on a single gene (VMAT2) and small 
differences on surveys about self-transcendence experiences (for details, see 
Hamer, 2004). But this is not the same as providing an argument for religion 
as an adaptation. Most obviously, the mutated gene may have evolved for rea- 
sons having nothing to do with religion, whereafter its religious significance 
(such as it is) kicks in as a side effect, and nothing is gained for the adapta- 
tion case. Unfortunately, Hamer does not investigate this alternative, so his 
argument for religion as an adaptation is weaker than he would like. Not 
holding anything back, Carl Zimmer, in his Scientzfic American review of the 
book, suggests an alternative title for T h  God Gene: "A Gene That Accounts 
for Less Than One Percent of the Variance Found in Scores on Psychological 
Questionnaires Designed to Measure a Factor Called Self-Transcendence, 
Which Can Signify Everything from Belonging to the Green Party to 
Believing in ESP, According to One Unpublished, Unreplicated Study." 
Evidently, we need clear criteria for establishing that something is an adap- 
tation, which brings us to Pinker's contribution to this volume. 
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Criteria for Adaptation (Pinker) 
Pinker helpfully lists four adaptationist explanations for the pervasive- 
ness of religious belief: religious beliefs are adaptive because (a) they truly 
describe the environment of human life, (b) they bring comfort, (c) they forge 
unified communities, or (d) they answer our need for moral values. His dis- 
cussion of these four explanations is extremely brief and serves mainly to 
indicate that he is more interested in explaining religion as a by-product of 
a host of behaviorally linked genetic traits. I agree with Pinker's preferred 
approach, so I am ready to appreciate his arguments against these four adap- 
tationist perspectives. 
In relation to (a), Pinker rightly treats as an empirically testable hypoth- 
esis religion's claim that its beliefs describe reality. But he considers only the 
theistic type of religion and only one type of theism, the one most vulner- 
able to falsification because it is strongly oriented to moral confidence and 
hope for a better world (i.e., a personal, caring, judging God). And then he 
dismisses all religious beliefs because of the empirical inadequacy of this par- 
ticular worldview. While I happen to agree with Pinker about the empirical 
implausibility of "a personal, attentive, invisible, miracle-working, reward- 
giving, retributive deity," I also think it is tendentious to choose this as the 
only representative of religious belief worth mentioning in the quest to test 
the empirical claims of religion. I would be glad to see a patient evaluation of 
the more theoretically persuasive, if less popular, forms of religious belief, the 
ones historically adopted by intellectuals because of their empirical adequacy, 
among other reasons. Some of these are broadly theistic, as in Aristotle's and 
Plato's worldviews and the philosophical theisms of Neoplatonism and South 
Asian religion. Others are nontheistic, as in philosophically refined versions 
of Buddhism, Daoism, and Confucianism. These belief systems are intellec- 
tually and existentially profound. 
In relation to (b) and (c), Pinker allows that religion may bring comfort 
to some people and may unite communities but rejects these as adaptationist 
explanations of religion because they do not establish why the characteristics 
in question are adaptive or, if they are, why their adaptive functions were 
the cause for the fixing of genetic predispositions to the associated beliefs 
and behaviors. In other words, the comforting and bonding elements of 
religion are available to all approaches to explaining religion, including the 
nongenetic approaches, and all will make use of them to explain why reli- 
gion persists, so the adaptationist can make special claim on them only if he 
or she also shows that these features of religion are adaptive in the original 
selection context in their specifically religious forms. This involves showing 
that other, nonreligious ways of getting access to the same comforting and 
groupbonding benefits are either impossible or less adaptive than the reli- 
gious ways. Unfortunately, Pinker's criticisms of these two adaptationist 
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explanations of religion merely ask for more detail and do not acknowledge 
that a lot more detail already exists in the literature on the subject. For exam- 
ple, Pinker asserts that we have no reason to think that religious beliefs could 
induce people to cooperate. But he does not say what is wrong with one of 
the core assertions of the "religion is adaptive because it facilitates coopera- 
tion" position, namely, that religion causes people to believe that their private 
thoughts are transparent to a supernatural power with an interest in pre- 
venting deception and promoting group loyalty. In the right social context, 
a person demonstrating such beliefs will be trusted by potential mates and 
the wider community alike and thus is more likely to have an opportunity 
to reproduce, passing along whatever genetic component plays into his or 
her predisposition to this sort of religious belief. These and related themes 
recur in the chapters of this volume, and it is unfortunate that Pinker does not 
address them but merely assumes that they carry no argumentative weight. 
In relation to (d), Pinker argues that the idea of a retributive, humanlike 
deity plays no role in our best explanations of the logic of morality. But 
this depends on which logic of morality we accept. I think the sociology of 
knowledge's interpretation of the role of morality in the social construction 
of reality is highly persuasive, particularly as e:laborated in Peter Berger's 
interpretation of religion as in part a means of legitimation and social con- 
trol (see Berger, 1967). Sociologist   mile Durkheim anticipates and inspires 
many of the insights of the sociology of knowledge (see Durkheim, 1915), 
including its recognition of religion as the means by which groups codify 
their core moral commitments. Similarly, Immanuel Kant's accounting of the 
natural logic of human moral reasoning demands a religious framework for 
moral reasoning to be rational and practical: our moral reasoning presumes 
(but cannot prove) standards of right and wrong vested in an ultimate moral 
judge who has the power to reward and punish. Kant and Durkheim and 
Berger cannot easily be swept aside. I consider religion's role in moral rea- 
soning and practical moral activity to be one of the strongest arguments for 
religion as an adaptation, but its strength derives essentially from group- 
bonding and cooperation considerations and from comfort considerations 
having to do with moral orientation and the management of cognitive dis- 
sonance-the second and third points on Pinker's list. 
Despite these difficulties, the main point of Pinker's argument is well 
taken. The fact that claims of adaptiveness are challenging to support in 
any domain makes the idea of religion as an adaptation difficult to estab- 
lish. He mentions three criteria for a trait to be an adaptation. The first two 
are more or less obvious: the trait has to be innate, and it must increase 
a population's average fitness in the ancestral environment. Pinker's third 
criterion is more complex because it concerns the epistemology of evidence 
as much as biology: arguments for the supposed increase in average fitness 
due to the putatively adaptive trait do not count if they take the form of 
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suspiciously convenient explanations ("j ust-so" stories). Rather, the argu- 
ments must justify the usefulness of the trait with independently convergent 
evidence from several perspectives. That is, arguments that some aspect of 
religion increases average fitness in a population have to be based not only on 
our ability to imagine their practical usefulness in an ancestral environment 
but also on evidence from some independent field, such as cognitive science 
or  biomechanical engineering. The criterion functions as a burden-shifting 
principle, defining what counts as a satisfactory argument for average fit- 
ness increase due to a trait and therefore setting the bar high for claims that 
religion is an adaptation. 
Evolutionary Side Effects 
There are many examples of side effects of adaptive traits that solve 
problems in ancestral environments (and perhaps also in contemporary 
cultural settings) and thus turn out to have a secondary adaptive function 
even though this is not the reason that the underlying traits were originally 
selected. Language and commerce are standard examples in the literature. 
In fact, even if side effects have no subsequent adaptive function or prove to 
be maladaptive, they may still be culturally important. For example, war is 
probably a side effect of genetic predispositions to violence, combined with 
the challenges of resource scarcity and possibly our inability to control pow- 
erful emotions, and it seems mostly maladaptive as a form of behavior, being 
extremely costly with questionable benefits at the best of times. 
Such side effects are very common in evolution, indeed far more numer- 
ous than direct adaptations. This only makes sense: as biological systems 
get more complex and carry more information, the number of potential 
trait interactions increases exponentially, well beyond the prodigiously high 
information limits of DNA. It is in this fuzzy world of trait interactions that 
most of culture comes to life. Cultures are diverse because they explore the 
vast space of human behavioral tendencies made possible by trait interac- 
tions in different ways. They take advantage of the opportunities presented 
by random events and the human learning capacity to determine quite 
different beliefs and behaviors, moral norms and social conventions, lan- 
guages, and life patterns. Most evolutionary psychologists seem to believe 
that it is in this space of possibilities that religion finds its origins. There are 
many theoretical frameworks for articulating precisely how this occurs, how- 
ever, and there is considerable controversy within evolutionary psychology 
over which theoretical framework is correct. 
Some of the questions that recur in disputes over the evolutionary ori- 
gins of religion as a side effect are as follows. (1) Given the complexity of 
religion, which features of religion are we all talking about in any given 
claim about its evolutionary origins? ( 9 )  How can we design experiments to 
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yield unambiguous determination of genetic traits having religious beliefs 
and behaviors as their side effects? (3) Given that the ancestral environment 
is no longer with us, how can we discern adaptive function in the original 
selection context of traits having religious beliefs and behaviors as their side 
effects in the contemporary world? (4) Were secondary adaptive functions of 
traits having religious beliefs and behaviors as their side effects evident from 
the beginning, even in the original selection context, or did those secondary 
adaptive functions only appear later, in changed environments? (5) Did reli- 
gious beliefs and behaviors ever have a secondary adaptive function or have 
they always been nonadapted or maladaptive? (6) Is it possible that some 
features of religion directly increased fitness in the original selection context 
and thus were adaptive, while other features were side effects with second- 
ary adaptive functions? (7) Can we place the entire research enterprise of the 
evolutionary origins of religion on firmer evidential foundations? 
These are enormously complicated questions, and evolutionary psychol- 
ogy is in some disarray partly because of their complexity. Terminological 
inconsistency plagues the literature, sometimes reflecting unclear concepts. 
A number of theorists have attempted to come to the rescue, offering key def- 
initions in an attempt to furnish a solid foundation for evolutionary psychol- 
ogy and to tame the zoo of crazy concepts and tangled terms. Stephen Jay 
Gould has been a particularly important figure because of his coining of the 
two terms "spandrel" (Gould & Lewontin, 1979) and "exaptation" (Gould & 
Vrba, 1982). His pluralistic approach to evolution was aimed at overthrowing 
what he saw as a selection-and-adaptationist-oriented orthodoxy and instill- 
ing an awareness of the prodigiously complex space of possibilities opened 
up by emergent complexity in the evolutionary process. Thus, Gould cham- 
pioned the idea of evolutionary side effects and pluralism of evolutionary 
mechanisms, along with evolutionary theorists such as Richard Lewontin, as 
far back as the 1970s. Since then, tidying-up efforts have improved the con- 
ceptual clarity of key terms, but some terminological confusion persists. 
Buss, Haselton, Shackelford, Bleske, and Wakefield (1998) explain this per- 
sistence by pointing out that sociologists, psychologists, anthropologists, and 
biologists working in evolutionary psychology-and I add religionists-with 
little or no training in evolutionary biology can get caught in the terminolog- 
ical difficulties because it is virtually impossible for an outsider to penetrate 
very far into the extremely technical literature on the subject, with its vast 
array of evidence and intricate argumentation. As Kirkpatrick points out in 
his chapter for this volume, it is nowhere truer than in evolutionary theory 
that a little knowledge can be a dangerous thing. But terminological differ- 
ences having potentially serious conceptual implications are common even 
among specialists. Indeed, authors in this volume use terminology about the 
evolutionary status of religious beliefs and behaviors differently. I pointed this 
out earlier in relation to signaling, and I note now that it is the case also with 
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terms such as "exaptation," "spandrel," and "functionless by-product." I am 
sure there are good reasons for any lexicon of terms. For the sake of consis- 
tency and to honor the one who coined key terms, here I follow Gould (1 99 I), 
as enhanced and corrected by Buss et al. (1998)-though I note the objections 
to Buss et al. (1998) advanced by Kennair (2002) and others. 
The key terms for describing evolutionary side effects are "exaptation," 
"spandrel," and "functionless by-product." Table 1 1.1 distinguishes these three 
concepts from one other and from adaptation and indicates how common each 
is in the real world, reflecting the previous argument that complexity exponen- 
tially increases in the space of possibilities for trait interaction. 
Brief discussions of exaptation, spandrel, and functionless by-product will 
illumine these distinctions. Gould's definition of exaptation has become the 
standard for both use and abuse, and I present it here using terms already 
discussed. An exaptation is a feature of an organism that originated not as an 
adaptation but as a side effect of an adaptation that proved (often much later) 
Table 11.1 Definitions of Evolutionary Adaptions Versus Evolutionary 
By-Products 
Functionless 
Adaptation Exaptation Spandrel By-Product 
Corresponds to a trait Yes No No No 
with an adaptive func- 
tion that caused the 
trait to become fixed in 
the original selection 
context 
Corresponds to a Possibly Yes 
trait with a secondary 
adaptive function in 
the original selection 
context or in some 
subsequent evolution- 
ary context 
Does not correspond Possibly Possibly 
to a trait but has a 
secondary adaptive 
function in the current 
context of study 
Relative frequency in 
human life within the 
current context of 
study as postulated by 
theorists 
Yes 
Rare Common Very Virtually 
common ubiquitous 
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to have a secondary adaptive function (see Gould, 199 1; Gould & Vrba, 1982). 
Gould spoke of cooption to describe the way evolution makes use of a second- 
ary adaptive function. 
Named for the more or less unprogrammed parts of an architectural 
design, Gould defined a spandrel as a side effect of biological features that 
were never selected for their usefulness even in the original selection con- 
text and yet subsequently prove to possess an adaptive function in a new 
evolutionary context (see Gould & Lewontin, 1979). One of his examples is a 
bridge that was not designed with shelter in mind but subsequently provides 
shelter to homeless people. 
Spandrels and exaptations collectively do not account for side effects with 
no adaptive functions in any later environment. Buss et al. (INS), in refining 
Gould's distinctions, call these functionless by-products. Of course, there are 
also a host of mndom efiects in evolutionary biology, and these play a role in 
all these concepts, including functionless by-products. Similarly, biology and 
context jointly present constmints that profoundly affect evolutionary design 
(there seem to be only two basic ways of connecting optic nerves to eyes, for 
example), and constraints figure in all of these concepts too. 
This lexicon of terms and associated concepts situates spandrels in a mid- 
dle space between exaptations and functionless by-products. On the one side, 
spandrels share with exaptations the functional characteristic of increasing 
fitness in some evolutionary environment, but spandrels differ from exapta- 
tions in being side effects of nonadapted characteristics, whereas exaptations 
are side effects of adapted traits. On the other side, spandrels share with 
functionless by-products the same evolutionary origins as side effects of non- 
adapted traits, but spandrels proved to be useful in the sense of increasing fit- 
ness in some evolutionary context, whereas functionless by-products never 
did or at least do not in the context assumed in a given study. 
Religion: Exaptation, Spandrel, or Functionless By-Product? 
The by-product explanation for religious beliefs and behaviors has proved 
important because it is so difficult to show that religon is an adaptation. 
Adaptation arguments fail typically because genetic predispositions to reli- 
gious beliefs and behaviors are not uniquely tied to those beliefs and behav- 
iors. Genetic predispositions to violence are not uniquely connected with 
war, genetic predispositions to appreciate beauty are not uniquely connected 
with art, and genetic predispositions to inquire are not uniquely connected 
with science. Yet war, art, and science can affect and obviously have affected 
fitness in a variety ways. r The same applies to religion. One much-talked-about feature of some 
religious beliefs concerns supernatural agents. It is extremely difficult to 
show that the cognitive predisposition to believe in supernatural causes is an 
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adaptation. Rather, this tendency probably derives from more basic cogni- 
tive strategies that are demonstrably adaptive but not uniquely tied to reli- 
gious beliefs, such as overactive pattern recognition skills and the readiness 
to impute intentionality to hard-to-interpret natural events. These abilities 
had an adaptive function in the ancestral environment because they enabled 
us to interpret movements in bushes as potentially dangerous and thereby 
helped us to escape predators. Overactive pattern recognition skills routinely 
led and still lead to cognitive error, to be sure, including running away from 
bushes when the wind rather than a tiger caused the rustling, but they can 
still be adaptive. In his chapter for this volume, Bulbulia illustrates another 
way that religious-cognitive error can sometimes increase fitness, namely, 
by gaining access to health-promoting placebo benefits. I t  follows that reli- 
gious beliefs and behaviors grounded in these cognitive capacities can be 
understood as sometimes adaptive side effects of traits originally adapted for 
nonreligious functions-that is, as exaptations. 
An evolutionary psychologist might conclude that religion is a spandrel 
rather than an exaptation. In that case, the argument concerns the original 
selection context for the features whose side effects underlie the religious 
behavior in question. If those features were based in traits that were origi- 
nally selected for some other adaptive function and now have a secondary 
adaptive function in religion, then we have an exaptation. If those features 
were not based in traits that were selected for some other adaptive function 
but rather were combinations of side effects of evolutionary design, spring- 
ing from chance events and merely expressing certain design constraints, 
then we have a spandrel. Of course, if you trace a spandrel back through its 
chain of dependencies far enough, you do find traits adapted for something 
somewhere, just as most family trees contain an aristocrat and a criminal. 
In this sense, the line between spandrels and exaptations is unclear. In his 
chapter for this volume, Pyysiainen illustrates this difficulty by describing 
the possibility of gene-culture evolution in relation to religion. This fur- 
ther obscures the conceptual boundary between spandrels and exaptations. 
But it is still important to  recognize that features of religion can be more 
and less remote from adapted traits. Adaptations just are adapted traits. 
Exaptations are side effects tightly linked to genes, with the side effect 
possibly co-occurring in the original selection context though never the 
cause of the fixing of the trait. Spandrels are more remote side effects with 
secondary adaptive functions. 
The distinction between exaptations and spandrels seems to have lit- 
tle bearing on the way religionists understand &eligion, as fascinating 
and important as this distinction may be in evolutionary biology generally. 
Much more important for religious studies is the distinction between both 
of these ideas and functionless by-products. The functionless by-product 
explanation of religion is a relatively rare viewpoint because most theorists 
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readily grant that religion helps to catalyze group cohesion and to  solve 
social problems ranging from deception to freeloading. The eventual adap- 
tiveness of religion seems obvious at the social level, therefore, even when 
we cannot agree on whether religion is an adaptation or an exaptation or a 
spandrel and even when we can't generate consensus around what are the 
relevant genetic traits and how closely they are tied to religious beliefs and 
behaviors. The functionless by-product viewpoint is most common among 
those who believe the moral downside of religious beliefs and behaviors out- 
weighs its strategic social benefits. This passionate antireligious position 
has an opposing twin in the equally passionate proreligious view that denies 
any genetic component in religion at all on the grounds (quite mistaken, 
I think) that a genetic link would evacuate religion of its spiritual value and 
sacred character. 
The contemporary value of religious beliefs and behaviors is a point of 
great moment for religionists and theologians alike, and it has enormous 
political and social significance. Detractors of religion have argued for cen- 
turies that we should eliminate religion (or many parts of religion) because it 
is bad for people. One way this is done these days is to argue that the badness 
of religion is due to its being maladaptive or a functionless by-product of the 
evolutionary process. In such cases, the assumption is that adaptive function 
is valuable and good, whereas we can dispose of evolutionary by-products 
with no adaptive function without any loss of value. None of the contributors 
to this volume explicitly makes this case, but a number of chapters certainly 
lean in that direction. For example, Pinker asks how a powerful taste for 
apparently irrational beliefs could evolve, and Bulbulia's argument depends 
on understanding religious beliefs in the framework of cognitive error. 
Religionists and theologians-including scholars with no religious 
affiliation-tend to find these sorts of characterizations of religious belief 
outrageous and inexcusable. I have heard terrible things said about such 
characterizations-shoddy scholarship! lazy interpretation! ideological 
nalvett.! T o  be completely direct about this, I think these criticisms are well 
earned in a few cases. Certainly the logical problems with such patterns of 
valuation are obvious. If adapted function really is good and maladaptation or 
no adaptation really is bad, then moral consistency demands a eugenics pro- 
gram to optimize adapted function, understood in some (no doubt ridiculous) 
way. If value accrues through adaptive function but not through function- 
less by-products, then most cultural artifacts are relegated to the low-value 
bargain-basement bin because they have not been around long enough to 
have much effect on human genes. So much for glorious cooking, fabulous 
new-year fireworks, and awe-inspiring architecture! 
I think religionists and theologians should go to war over these issues 
with the few ideologically extreme scientists guilty of such sins. That is cer- 
tainly preferable to bending over backward trying to be tolerant, perhaps 
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because religionists condescendingly think that scientists can't be expected 
to understand the multidimensionality of value or because religionists are 
cowed by science's current cultural prestigewhich, I note with concern, is 
capable of being squandered if a few shrill scientists do not learn to speak in 
public with greater depth of awareness. It  is important to remember at this 
point that this sharp criticism is being leveled by a religionist and theologian 
already inclined to see human religion in many respects as a kind of agonized 
striving against the difficulties and uncertainties of life, full of cognitive self- 
deception, and unaware of the social forces that drive it. Despite this reli- 
gious and moral critique of religious beliefs and behavior, I am deeply moved 
by the empirical fact that religion has enormous and genuine value for vast 
numbers of people. Moreover, this value is assessable independently of any 
considerations of evolutionary fitness. In other words, my criticism is not 
religious special pleading but a demand for more intellectual sophistication 
across the board. 
Spleen vented, I note that religionists and theologians still stand to learn a 
great deal from scientists about the oripns of religion by studying its adaptive 
functions, both in the original selection context and in subsequent evolutionary 
environments. But little is gained for the religionist or the theologian by master- 
ing the intricate debates over adaptations versus exaptations versus spandrels 
since little depends on the details of how religion evolved once it is granted that 
relipon is in fact partly the product of evolutionary processes. 
No contributor to this volume argues either that relipon is a functionless 
by-product or that religious beliefs and behaviors have no genetic component 
at all. The strongest argument for relipon as an adaptation is probably that 
of Bulbulia, whose chapter's subtitle describes religiosity as "an adaptation for 
health and cooperation." There is no representative of any of the supposedly 
classic views of religion as an adaptation, either based on specific genes or based 
on specific brain modules that increase reproductive fitness. The most explicit 
argument against religion as an adaptation is that of Kirkpatrick, who titles 
his chapter simply "Religion Is Not an Adaptation." The other contributors, 
while possibly allowing that some features of religion may be adaptations or 
functionless by-products, stand firmly in the exaptation-spandrel region of the 
explanatory spectrum with regard to most features of religion. Here I focus on 
Kirkpatrick's argument that religion is a complex combination of side effects 
that have a variety of adaptive functions. 
Religion as a Collection of Multiple By-Products 
(Kirkpatrick) 
In his chapter, Kirkpatrick articulates a~multiple-side-effects hypothesis 
about the origins of religion. He does this in lovely prose, clearly, and with a 
focus on saying why adaptationist explanations of religion fail. This should 
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be particularly helpful for readers of this volume. If they want a detailed 
explanation ofattachment theory, which is the heart of Kirkpatrick's positive 
viewpoint, they can consult his 2004 book on the evolutionary psychology 
of religion. 
Kirkpatrick's attack on adaptationist explanations of religon is entertaining 
and insightful. He begins by showing how slender the evidence is for the adap  
tationist view, especially God modules and God genes. He then points out that 
the adaptationist view faces serious theoretical problems. For instance, he shows 
that adaptationists by the nature of the case have to explain religion through 
one or maybe two adaptive traits so that they inevitably end up focusing on cer- 
tain bits of religion and leaving other pieces out. They might focus on religious 
experience but leave out group bonding and morality, or else they emphasize 
cognitive susceptibility to supernatural beliefs but neglect ritual. Kirkpatrick 
further argues that adaptationists tend to conflate the psychological benefits 
of religion with reproductive fitness, they often underestimate the fitness costs 
of alleged religious adaptations, and they remain tantalizingly vague on the 
key question of the mechanisms by which religious traits get selected for their 
specifically r e l i ~ o u s  adaptive function-all big no-nos in evolutionary theory. 
He concludes by stating his own view, that "relipon represents a collection of 
byproducts of a variety of mechanisms that evolved for other (nonreligious) 
purposes" (Kirkpatrick, pp. 272-275). 
As I noted earlier, it is more difficult to locate bona fide defenders of the 
religion-as-adaptation view than one might suspect, pven the frequency with 
which they are attacked. Unfortunately, Kirkpatrick does not cite many-o r  
any-bona fide defenders of the relipon-as-adaptation view, despite saying 
often enough that God modules and God genes are "commonly cited as rea- 
sons to think that religion is an adaptation. He mentions Hamer (2004)~ but even 
Hamer acknowledges that the case for religion as adaptation is difficult to make 
out, and Kirkpatrick himself notes this. I suspect that this lack of cited oppo- 
nents is evidence of a difference between what gets published in evolutionary 
psychology and the way evolutionary psychologists talk-a distinction needed 
to make sense of many disciplines. Or perhaps Kirkpatrick is indirectly attack- 
ing the media frenzy around the religion-as-adaptation view, which reflects the 
public's fondness for oversimplified pictures of complex phenomena. 
Be that as it may, thecaseagainst adaptation is wellmade here. Kirkpatrick's 
argument definitely shifts the burden of proof to his opponents, showering 
them with challenges to meet in order to justify any claim that religion is an 
adaptation. 
Religion as a Baldwin Phenomenon (Pyysiainen) 
Pyysiainen's chapter for this volume might well be treated in the next 
section, on the cognitive dimensions of religion. I mention it here because he 
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argues that religion has an evolutionary history similar to that of language; 
both are products of gene-culture coevolution. Like Kirkpatrick, Pyysiainen 
thinks that religion is not an adaptation or a collection of adaptations in 
itself, but he emphasizes more strongly than Kirkpatrick does the role of 
gene-culture coevolution in the origins of religion. 
T o  make this point, Pyysiainen refers to the late nineteenth-century writ- 
ings of James Baldwin, after whom the Baldwin effect is named. The Baldwin 
effect as it is used today (Pyysidnen cites Deacon, 1997; Dennett, 1991) is 
actually a variety of mechanisms whereby learned behavior leads to genetic 
changes. The most obvious examples, which Pyysiainen does not mention, 
are learned social stigmas against people with genetic disorders, which limit 
the spread of the genes in question. A more interesting example is language, 
which Pyysiainen does discuss. According to Terrence Deacon (1997), human 
language is an instance of the Baldwin effect: it is a three-way coevolution 
of vocal-tract physiology, the cognitive capacity for symbolic reference, and 
communicative social environments. Language was not directly selected for 
in the evolutionary process, but it comes to have an adaptive function anyway 
once it arrives on the scene. Pyysiainen thinks that much the same is true 
. . 
of religion. If that is the case, he argues, then religion derives neither from 
cognitive adaptations specific to religious beliefs nor from simple side effects 
of traits that were selected for their nonreligious adaptive functions. Rather, 
religion is a collection of side effects that changes culture and thereby alters 
what gets selected in the evolutionary process. I would have appreciated more 
detail at this point so as to grasp more clearly how Pyysiainen believes reli- 
gion changes the terms of natural selection. I presume he has in mind sexual 
selection effects, as when mate selection is guided in part by a preference for 
partners who use religious beliefs and practices to signal their reliability. 
The consequences for religion of this gene-culture resonance are inter- 
esting, too, and again akin to the evolution of language. Brains evolve much 
more slowly than both languages and religions. Just as languages that chil- 
dren cannot learn do not become important, so religions that fail to make 
cognitive sense to children do not get much play. T o  apply Pyysiainen's 
framework to a religious example that is important to me, I suspect his anal- 
ogy with language leads to the correct analysis of liberal religion: if a great 
deal of education is required to make sense of a religious outlook, which is 
the case for liberal and naturalist forms of religion, then its influence is likely 
to be confined to an intellectual elite and its numbers small. 
COGNITIVE DIMENSIONS OF RELIGION 
Religion is not only about beliefs. But there is no question that beliefs are a 
big part of religion. And there is also no question that beliefs in supernatural 
agents are quite common in religion. The prevalence of supernatural beliefs 
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inspires us to ask what it is about human evolution that leaves us, as a rule, so 
willing to entertain supernatural causes and agents. This has been the focus 
of intense research in recent decades, and a number of the authors in this 
volume present their perspectives on what has been discovered. 
Before setting out in this new direction, however, I wish to point out that 
there have always been religious people who reject supernatural beliefs as 
superstitious and will have nothing to do with them. They are common in our 
time, too. Judging from this volume, which in this respect faithfully reflects 
the wider literature in cognitive psychology of religion, these nonsuper- 
naturalist, antisuperstitious religious folk are not taken seriously or treated 
with respect. They are not even mentioned as exceptions to a rule, and the 
resulting cognitive theories of religion strike religionists and theologans as 
exceedingly fragile. This is an obvious instance where deeper knowledge of 
religion might help scientists studying religion to deal with powerful con- 
traindicating evidence. 
Religion and Supernatural Beliefs (Bering) 
Bering's chapter is a well-written survey of research on the cognitive psy- 
chology of belief in the supernatural. The awareness of the complexity of 
religion that he demonstrates at the end of his chapter is particularly com- 
mendable. His research focuses on children, on the grounds that we can use 
their rapid cognitive development to assess what level of cognitive complex- 
ity would have been needed to entertain the idea of supernatural agents in 
the evolutionary process. This makes sense as a research strategy because 
there are so few avenues of approach to questions about levels of cognitive 
development in evolution, but it is a dubious assumption just the same. 
Bering reports on experiments designed to test whether the human ten- 
dency to believe in supernatural agents and states is innate or acquired 
through cultural exposure. His results suggest that even the youngest 
children are inclined to impute mental states to a dead mouse eaten by 
an alligator in a puppet play. Yet these youngest of children rarely men- 
tioned beliefs about afterlife prevalent in their culture, which older chil- 
dren tended to do. Bering concludes that belief in an afterlife cannot be 
entirely a matter of cultural conditioning and that we have here evidence 
for an innate tendency to treat mental states as fundamental and persistent 
regardless of bodily state. 
There are several problems here. First, Bering's research question about 
innateness versus social acquisition presumes that the two options jointly 
exhaust the possibilities. But this omits the possibility that children are born 
with another innate tendency, namely, to develop a theory of other minds, 
which initially applies to everything and so often misfires. With the greater 
cognitive sophistication of later childhood, however, children can detect 
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inferential mistakes and thus implicitly feel their need for a more plausible 
intellectual framework for mental states beyond death, whereon they adopt 
whatever sophisticated framework their environment offers. This interpre- 
tation is quite opposed to Bering's yet consistent with the data he presents. 
Second, Bering's method of approach is flawed in tha t , s leas t  as he describes 
f-, he does not conduct the experiment on a broadly cross- 
cultural basis so as to control for the effect of cultural exposure. This 
ought to be an important check on his interpretation of these preliminary 
results. Third, a subtler methodological difficulty is that such experiments 
are notorious for not successfully controlling for extraneous factors, such 
as the experimenter's interview technique (tone of voice, facial expressions) 
and contextual factors (subjects may enter an "as if' mode of explanation 
as dictated by the experimental context). This can result in answers that 
do not reflect authentic metaphysical opinions but rather merely the sorts 
of answers that ought to be gven  in the context of such a language game. 
Despite these difficulties, this sort of research is just getting started, and 
Bering's results are fascinating and useful within limits. 
Bering acknowledges that belief in supernatural entities depends on more 
fundamental cognitive traits and so rejects the idea that it is an adaptation. He 
presents experimental evidence to support his claim that such beliefs cause a 
Santa Claus effect wherein human beings believe they are being watched, with 
attendant improvements in behavior and conceivably an increase in aver- 
age fitness. It follows that the cognitive traits underlying the tendency to 
believe in the supernatural have a secondary adaptive function even though 
they were probably selected originally for a more cognitively basic adaptive 
function. That makes them exaptations rather than spandrels, in Bering's 
terminology, but in the lexicon introduced here, this shows only that they 
are exaptations or spandrels but not functionless by-products. The question 
of whether belief in the supernatural is an exaptation or a spandrel has to be 
settled by analyzing whether it is a side effect of a trait. Bering argues for the 
former, so belief in the supernatural is an exaptation rather than a spandrel, 
but for different reasons than he gives. 
Religion, Cognition, and Emotion (Atran) 
Atran perceives the importance and value of religion in a multileveled 
way. This is enormously helpful when communicating with religionists and 
theologians and also a prerequisite for responsibly carrying out public com- 
mentary duties. I note, moreover, that this does not interfere even a tiny bit 
with a fair-minded and rational scientific approach to analyzing the cogni- 
tive and evolutionary roots of religion, which is Atran's goal in his chap- 
ter for this volume. He does oversimplify religion, unfortunately, but not as 
egregiously as some others. 
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As the subtitle of his 2 0 0 1  book In Gods We Trust: The Evolutionary 
Landscape $Religion suggests, Atran sees the human evolutionary heritage 
as a landscape that constrains, without determining, the development and 
function of individuals, cultures, and religions. This leads to an interpreta- 
tion of religion as a recurring by-product of more basic evolutionary traits, 
of course, but the interesting point in Atran's theory is that he claims to 
account for variations in religious beliefs and behavior as different jour- 
neys within the constraining landscape. Is there really this much freedom 
to structure religion differently in different cultural settings? Atran gives 
the impressiori that the freedom is rather limited when he claims that many 
fundamental structures recur in all religions, such as supernatural agents, 
rhythmic coordination of affective bodily states, and social devices to pro- 
mote cooperation and deal with deception. Empirically, he is mistaken on this 
point in the sense that there are numerous unexplained exceptions of which 
religionists are sharply aware, and his argument would be much stronger 
if he acknowledged the exceptions and explained them instead of speaking 
of religion as if these exceptioris did not exist. But the nonsupernaturalist 
subtraditions within the world's religions are in the minority, as are those 
that shun rhythmic coordination of affective bodily states and those that have 
no important social component, so his general point about landscape-based 
constraints on religious beliefs and behaviors probably survives. 
Atran stresses that the cognitive functions associated with supernatural 
beliefs are present in many domains of human life, including our appreciation 
for fictional cartoon characters. It is the emotional freight associated with 
religion that makes all the difference in bonding communities together, solv- 
ing social challenges of cooperation and deception, and inspiring the willing- 
ness to sacrifice that he sees in the Islamic jihadists he st 
therefore, is how the conceptual foundations of religion 
ramify religious beliefs so powerfully that people are 
willing to die for them. His answer is similar to that of Pascal Boyer ( 2 0 0 1 ) ,  
and I quote a key passage from Atran's chapter that compactly express 
it: "The conceptual foundations of religion are intuitively given by task- 
specific panhuman cognitive domains, including folk mechanics, folk biology, 
and folk psychology. Core religious beliefs minimally violate ordinary intu- 
itions about how the world is, with all its inescapable problems, thus enabling 
people to imagine minimally impossible supernatural worlds that solve exis- 
tential problems, including death and deception." 
A useful feature of Atran's chapter is the experimental evidence he pres- 
ents in support of the memorable quality of minimally counterintuitive beliefs. 
This helps to explain why supernatural religious beliefs persist and thus fits the 
theory of religion as a cultural product passed from generation to generation 
because it makes sense to children and solves social and existential problems. 
What is less clear, here as well as in Boyer (ZOOI), is precisely how minimal 
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counterintuitiveness is adaptive, which is crucial to understanding the evolu- 
tionary origins of relipon, as against its persistence. In any event, perhaps the 
most impressive aspects of Atran's contribution are his appreciation for the pas- 
sionate intensity of much religion, which helps him stay empirically true to 
some of its complexity, and his ability to harmonize the cognitive elements of 
religion with the emotional, ritual, social, and moral dimensions. 
Consequences for Religious Studies and Theology 
Just as CST has the potential to transform the branches of religious stud- 
ies that focus on ritual, so cognitive science of the sort that Bering and Atran 
present has the potential to transform the way religious studies approaches 
phenomena related to religious belief. The field of comparative religious 
ideas within religious studies and theology is quite young, but already it 
has become dominated by the view that religious ideas are usually too full 
of richly layered existential and contextual meanings to be significantly 
compared to one another. While anyone who knows anything about religion 
finds it easy to appreciate this view, it also seems somewhat defeatist, cutting 
off a valid line of inquiry before it gets started. I suspect that the landscape 
constraints that Atran describes, backed by the sorts of experiments that 
both he and Bering summarize, could provoke a more balanced approach 
in comparative religious ideas, opening religionists and theologians to the 
possibility that religious beliefs might be a mix of constraints that produce 
recurring similarities and cultural or chance determinations that produce 
differences. By the same token, the cognitive science of religion would do 
well to notice the staggering wealth of detailed information that religious 
studies specialists have collected about the world's religious beliefs and prac- 
tices. Unfortunately, cognitive scientists sometimes speak as if their wisdom 
on similarities and differences in world religious beliefs should be taken seri- 
ously even though they know less than a rank novice in religious studies 
about the vast associated literatures. 
The cognitive science of religion has particularly challenging implications 
for some forms of theology. Theology rarely investigates the truth claims of 
religion in respect of the evolutionary function of the corresponding beliefs 
or the cognitive appeal of minimal counterintuitiveness. Were theologians to 
address such issues frankly, they would necessarily make manifest the social 
and psychological dynamics of religion, which seem to work more smoothly 
when religious people remain unaware of them. The theologian is not alone 
in this. The social scientist who is also a member of a religious community 
likewise knows firsthand the stressful experience of being a participant- 
observer. But the first-order intellectual tasks of psychologists and sociolo- 
gists of religion do not involve nurturing the religious faith of believers, so 
their role is more easily accepted and understood in religious communities. 
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Theologians who take it as part of their moral obligation to support the 
spiritual well-being of religious believers and who begin publicly discussing 
the cognitive science of religion may find themselves in an especially dif- 
ficult situation. They can be understood as betraying their calling, and they 
may be-indeed, they often have been-resisted both by other theologians 
and by the very religious groups they seek to serve. This led Van Harvey to 
describe such an impossibly doubly committed intellectual as an "alienated 
theologian." It follows that there are powerful incentives for such theologians 
not to take up the social sciences, evolutionary psychology, or the cognitive 
psychology of religion with the seriousness these lines of research deserve. 
Of course, at this point it is important to recall that there are many kinds of 
theologians, some of whom have secular and nonreligiously affiliated intel- 
lectual projects, and they are not so constrained. 
R E L I G I O N  A N D  A D A P T I V E  F U N C T I O N  
W e  first considered the costly signaling argument that bizarre religious 
behaviors can have adaptive functions in communicative environments, 
removing an objection to the thesis that religion is in part a product of the 
evolutionary process. Then we saw that, while religious studies and theology 
may have little at stake in the technical debates over the evolutionary status 
of religious beliefs and behaviors, they have a great deal to learn from the 
fact that religion becomes intelligible when understood at least in part as a 
product of evolutionary processes. Subsequently, we noticed how religion 
makes still more evolutionary sense when its entanglements with human 
cognitive evolution are taken into account. These three themes arc through 
the chapters of this volume-most authors mention all of them, at least in 
passing-and jointly they constitute an extremely persuasive case that reli- 
gion is best understood in close connection with evolutionary biology and 
evolutionary psychology. This volume also contains other arguments about 
the adaptive functions of religion, all of which contribute to strengthening 
the case for religion as at least in part a product of the evolutionary process. 
I take those up briefly in the following section. 
Religion and Sacred Emotions (Emmons and McNamara) 
Emmons and McNamara use a costly signaling framework to explain 
how character strengths can increase cooperation and thereby average fit- 
ness. Strengths of character include honesty, trustworthiness, integrity, and 
emotions such as gratitude. They contend that religion is a universal feature 
of human life and a crucial promoter of such emotions, behaviors, and char- 
acter strengths. It follows that scientists studying the evolution of emotion 
and the neuropsychology of character should take into account the role of 
The Significance of the Evolution of Religious Belief and Behavior 265 
religion. The authors kindly provide a usefully compact survey of the scien- 
tific study of religion and emotion that points interested readers more deeply 
into the relevant literatures. They then launch into their case, showing that 
CST helps to make evolutionary sense of sacred emotions such as gratitude. 
In particular-and this takes us a step beyond Sosis-they argue that reli- 
gion inculcates in people genuine virtues to the degree that their consistent 
integrity and generosity are virtually impossible to fake. In this light, religion 
appears to be an indispensable component in the "gene-culture arms race" to 
solve social cooperation problems through unfakable signals of reliability. The 
unfakable signals in this case are actually genuine virtues. 
It is a pleasing change of pace to read a chapter that takes ordinary virtues 
seriously and does not allow their evolutionary role to leave them somehow 
questionable. In fact, it is quite unusual to find scientists who take value 
seriously at a number of levels at once rather than just at the level that sci- 
ence can most easily handle through quantification. This kind of humane and 
humanistic perspective does not interfere with the precision of the argument 
from a scientific perspective. And from a religionist's perspective, the argu- 
ment is more compelling and realistic because it resists the sorts of "nothing- 
but" reductionism that indirectly suggests (while rarely directly claiming) 
that the things reduced have only the value of that to which they are reduced. 
This kind of sensitivity will increase the influence of the scientific study of 
religion as well as its intellectual quality, and I think more authors should 
follow Emmons and McNamara's example. 
Religion and Traditional Moral Values 
(Koenig and Bouchard) 
Koenig and Bouchard are concerned with the sorts of evidence that scien- 
tists must seek in order to establish heritability of characteristics (for the sake 
of clarity, note that they use "trait" both in the generic sense, here translated 
to "characteristics," and in the specific sense of "genetic trait"). Their chapter 
is important in this volume because it illustrates how complicated arguments 
about genetic linkage typically are and also because it indirectly highlights the 
lack of sophistication in some science writing about genetic linkage. It is a lot 
easier to claim that a religious belief or a behavior is genetically linked than it is 
actually to demonstrate this. Unfortunately, the shortcut to genetic l i n k a g e  
that is, just stating it rather than showing it-is taken rather often in evolu- 
tionary psychology literature, without due notice. Yet Koenig and Bouchard 
are motivated to do this for another reason entirely, namely, to refute what they 
say is a common claim, namely, that moral values and religiousness are formed 
by family socialization independently of any genetic component. Koenig and 
Bouchard's specific interest is in the heritability of certain moral values that 
correlate significantly with one another on standard measures. They call the 
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moral values authoritarianism, conservatism, and religiousness-jointly, the 
traditional moral values triad (TMVT). 
The authors do not immediately'reject the idea that religousness is a bio- 
logical adaptation, acknowledging that the universality of the religious ten- 
dency and the structural similarities of its various manifestations do indeed 
suggest that it may be an adaptation. They even go so far as to mention 
the counterargument that religion often involves avoidable suicide and mar- 
tyrdom, answering it with the standard CST reply that highly demanding 
groups produce highly committed members, citing military basic training 
and hazing as illustrations. With admirable caution, however, Koenig and 
Bouchard do not buy in to the adaptationist line. In fact, they rightly insist 
that heritability does not imply adaptation, a point we have seen many times 
in this volume in the form of "religion is a by-product not an adaptation" the- 
ses. This sort of balanced caution and precision is characteristic of the entire 
chapter and a most welcome virtue. 
The bulk of the chapter concerns evidence for the heritability of the 
TMVT from twin and adoption studies, and what a fabulous array of evi- 
dence it is. I would have to check my amateur impression with experts, but 
the data appear to support their conclusion that the three components of the 
TMVT are significantly heritable. I assume that this is equivalent to tossing 
a cat into the pigeon cage of researchers studying socialization and that this 
is precisely the effect that Koenig and Bouchard intend. Among religious 
studies specialists, researchers routinely proceed as if socialization were the 
only significant factor in interpreting decisions to stay affiliated with reli- 
gious groups. Religious educators rarely entertain the idea of a genetic com- 
ponent to religiousness, let alone address the significance of this for their 
strategic proposals. Anyone involved in socialization research needs to keep 
an eye on this research. 
Likewise, theologians speculating about universal religious instincts, uni- 
versal quests for salvation or liberation, and universal longings for ultimate 
meaning may need to pause and consider how the heritability of authoritari- 
anism, conservatism, and religiousness fit into their speculations. Religious 
doctrines that propose a universal religious state of humanity may have been 
formed by people inclined to believe and seek such theories and reinforced 
by others with the same inclinations. This selection bias may not mean that 
the beliefs are false, but it does suggest that serious challenges to them are 
probably going to be encountered far less often than would seem appropriate 
if empirical adequacy is part of the goal. 
Religion and Ritual Healing (McClenon) 
McClenon's chapter for this volume recapitulates part of the argument 
from his 2001 book on shamanic healing practices. His strategy is sensible: if 
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current-day shamanism gives us the best insight into early hominid life, then 
we should study shamanism in order to understand the origins of religion. 
When we do that, dissociation and ritual suggestion come to the fore as the 
means by which shamans mediate therapeutic benefits to those with whom 
they work. Thus, McClenon concludes that ritual healing lies at the origins 
of religion: "ritual healing practices shaped genotypes governing the human 
capacity for dissociation and hypnosis, allowing modern forms of religiosity." 
McClenon, unlike many other defenders of religion as a by-product of some 
trait or traits, actually states what the underlying trait is: a capacity for dis- 
sociation and hypnosis. This trait gets established in the human population 
because its therapeutic benefits give a fitness advantage to those who have 
it. And its aftereffects include social codification of the procedures that maxi- 
mize those fitness benefits, which is ritual healing, leading in due course to 
religion. This is the ritual healing theory of the origins of religion. 
McClenon's case is carefully argued and well written. I contend, however, 
that it tells a plausible story about only one of the evolutionary by-products 
that are assembled in contemporary religions beliefs and practices. T o  adapt 
Kirkpatrick's criticism, which he made more narrowly in the context of bat- 
tling adaptationist arguments, it is insufficient to theorize about one compo- 
nent of religious beliefs and practices as if this could lead to a theory of the 
origins of religion. Strangely, despite the flow of McClenon's rhetoric toward 
explaining the origins of religion (e.g., as in the previous quote), in the con- 
clusion of his chapter he straightforwardly acknowledges that his ritual heal- 
ing theory "does not preclude group selection theories and other processes 
that may have shaped religious genotypes." And this admission follows right 
on the heals of a list of distinctive advantages of the ritual healing theory 
as an explanation of religion, including its genetic basis, which cannot hold 
true if his theory does not preclude other theories purporting to explain the 
genetic basis of religiosity. I conclude that McClenon has overstated his case 
slightly but that the overstatement affects only the comprehensiveness of his 
account of the evolutionary origins of religion. 
Other scientists inquiring into the origins of religion would do well to 
follow McClenon's example of specificity and clarity about underlying traits 
and selection mechanisms. And their theories will have to take account of 
McClenon's. 
Religion and Placebo Benefits (Bulbulia) 
I mentioned Bulbulia's chapter in passing several times already, hut here I 
focus on it in connection with the alleged adaptiveness of religion by means 
of its placebo benefits. Bulbulia's entertaining chapter is the only one in this 
volume explicitly to acknowledge the problematic effects of his scientific meth- 
odological naturalism on his treatment of the subject matter and explicitly to 
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argue in favor of it anyway. This shows an impressive degree of methodologi- 
cal self-awareness. But it also leads him to describe religious beliefs as cogni- 
tive errors, based, as far as I can see, only on the assumption that supernatural 
beings, whether or not they exist, do not do anything in the world, so if you 
think they do, you must be wrong. I happen to agree with Bulbulia's (stated) 
assumption that supernatural beings do not interfere in natural processes. In 
my case, this is because I believe that supernatural beings do not exist (i.e., I am 
a religious naturalist). Even so, I think impressive methodolopcal self-aware- 
ness does not excuse preemptive settling of metaphysical claims, which is what 
the phrase "cognitive error" does. Nevertheless, as Bulbulia himself requests, 
we should give him the benefit of the doubt and see how far he can get with his 
"as if not" assumptions about supernatural beings. 
Bulbulia is the closest this volume has to a living, breathing adaptationist. 
He accepts the argument that relipon is universal feature of human life because 
it is a biologcal endowment. And he suspects that McClenon (discussed pre- 
viously) puts his finger on the reason why: that reliposity evolved to foster 
placebo health benefits. But McClenon's case in his chapter is more cautious 
than Bulbulia's. McClenon argues that the capacity for dissociation and sug- 
gestion were what evolved, not relipon. These traits evolved in a long-term 
gene-culture evolution nexus (ritual healing) driven by the fitness advantages 
that dissociation and suggestion confer. Religion is a by-product. I have not 
consulted McClenon's other writings, and perhaps Bulbulia interprets them 
correctly, but it is important to note that McClenon is not making an adapta- 
tion case for the origins of religion in this volume. Despite this quibble over 
interpreting McClenon, Bulbulia offers a fascinating defense and extension of 
McClenon's case, one that is far more closely geared to the evolutionary biol- 
ogy literature than McClenon's own way of arguing. 
At the heart of Bulbulia's case is the claim that healing and religiosity use 
the same kind of cognitive structures, including especially supernatural beliefs. 
That is, supernatural entities both heal and perform religiously relevant func- 
tions, such as saving, protecting, and enlightening. Given the way healing 
mechanisms work through dissociation and suggestion, only those that truly 
believe with unshakable confidence will be healed. T o  be healed, correspond- 
ingly, is an unfakable sign of religious commitment. This kind of CST argument 
welds ritual healing theory, religious cognition, and the social elements of reli- 
gion into a flexible and multifaceted theoretical edifice. Even so, I doubt that all 
these features of human behavior can be so tightly correlated with a few genes 
so that religion is rightly described as an adaptation. 
CONCLUSION 
The chapters in this volume contain a wealth of information about evolu- 
tion and religion. While I certainly have scratched the surface in this chapter, 
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I was obliged to leave many ideas and arguments untouched. This testifies 
to the collective complexity and value of the chapters. In this conclusion, I 
confine myself to three brief points. 
First, concerning reductionism, I think it is extremely unlikely that we 
will ever comprehend the evolved diversity and complexity of religious 
beliefs and practices using only one of the existing theoretical frameworks 
for explaining the origins of religion. Nor is it likely that we can cleanly pri- 
oritize these theories, ranking the most fundamental ahead of the derivative 
and gaining a clear impression of what came first and why. In certain corners 
of the evolutionary-origins-of-religion marketplace, there are enthusiastic 
groups hawking their favorite viewpoint as the key to understanding reli- 
gion. A few chapters in this volume show traces of such enthusiastic convic- 
tion. Yet a fair-minded reader of a variety of serious theories must allow that 
many have the beginnings of a robust empirical basis and impressive theo- 
retical integrity. The problem with one-sided enthusiasm among scientists 
is reductionism of the varied and complex phenomena of religion merely to 
what falls within the ambit of the theoretical framework for explaining its 
origins and functions. At this point, the religious studies specialist insists on 
urging their scientist colleagues to honor the complexity of the phenomena 
they seek to analyze and to take more seriously properly rich descriptions of 
religion. Many theoretical frameworks will have to play a role in explaining 
the origins and functions of religions (notice the plurals) because religions 
are too diverse, complex, paradoxical, existentially vibrant, and socially 
potent for any one theory to express the very heart of religion, if there even 
is such a thing, without massive oversimplification. 
Religionists rightly resist theories that seek to give a substantially com- 
prehensive account of the origins and functions of religions yet do not reg- 
ister this mass of contradictory details and exception-filled patterns that is 
religion in actual practice. In this way, religionists claim the role of data 
gatherers and data parsers for scientists aiming to present evolution-based 
and cognition-based hypotheses about these data. The interpretation of "reli- 
gion as a whole," whatever that contested concept finally means, is a shared 
endeavor that requires contributions from religionists and scientists alike. 
Interested theologians need to be fully aware of developments in this joint 
investigation so as to avoid their own version of reductionism as they seek to 
interpret religious phenomena. 
I have drawn attention to a few of the many places where the chapters in 
this volume oversimplify the complexity of religion or speak as if its value 
were confined to the aspects that science could grasp. While I defended an 
appropriate reductionism as a feasible strategy for studying religion, I also 
want to challenge specialists in the scientific study of religion to strive for 
intelligent selection of salient features of religion and to shun damaging 
forms of reductionism. I have tried in a few places to suggest how deeper and 
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broader knowledge of religious phenomena might help scientists to be more 
accurate and to avoid proposing causal theories of religion that presume 
data against which religionists effortlessly point out numerous unexplained 
exceptions. Realizing how infuriating their simplistic characterizations seem 
to specialists in religious studies and theology may be enough to trigger bet- 
ter scholarship. Otherwise, perhaps they will be inspired to greater care by 
the awesome responsibility of speaking in public about religion with authen- 
tic respect and genuine learning at a time when a great deal depends on such 
skillful public speech. 
Second, not one of the scientific contributors to this book gives any evi- 
dence of realizing that there are such things as naturalistic religious outlooks 
and naturalistic theologies. The emphasis on supernaturalism is overbear- 
ingly strong, which leaves the reader floundering when trying to make sense 
of philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle, Sankara and Lao-tzu, on whose 
thought vast traditions of religious philosophy have been built. Many theo- 
logians have held-and many living theologians insist-that supernatural- 
ism is the antithesis of authentic religion because (so they say) it embraces 
cognitive self-deception for the sake of undeniable communal benefits and 
immediate but uncertain comfort. There are plenty of theologians who will 
reject this naturalist theological outlook as a faithless betrayal of one or 
another home tradition, but it is not a perverse or destructive challenge to 
conventional religion. Rather, it is a theological articulation of a vision of 
human spiritual and moral maturity. It has a great deal in common with 
secular humanism and a great fondness for learning in all forms. It functions 
within all religious traditions, often on the underside or in the interstices of 
religious sociality, as a challenging goal for serious religious people of a par- 
ticular type. T o  have seen this intellectually and socially important religious 
perspective discussed, even as an exception to the rule, would have been 
gratifying to me and many other religionists and theologians who are likely 
to pick up this volume and take seriously its topic. T o  ignore it altogether, 
without any explanation, is bizarre. Be that as it may, it is especially impor- 
tant to note that naturalistic theological viewpoints accommodate scientific 
insights into the origins and functions of religion easily and constructively. 
And that should be as interesting to thoughtful scientists studying religion 
as their scientific work is to such religionists and theologians. 
Finally, and most important, religionists and theologians must accommo- 
date insights from the scientific study of religion. I pointed out many areas 
where the theories emerging from evolutionary psychology not only would 
influence but also could potentially utterly transform religious studies and 
theology. Many religionists and theologians will go their own way in the 
specialized language games of their discourse communities, of course, but 
their work will be the poorer for neglecting this emerging literature. Those 
theologians and religionists who do engage the scientific study of religion 
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have a daunting task ahead of them. They will seek to make sense of the way 
that religion engages human beings with ultimate realities. And they will 
do this with a view of religion as, in part, an ad hoc, complex, and variable 
assemblage of adapted and exapted genetic traits constraining culturally col- 
ored exploration of a landscape of social and existential possibilities. That is 
a difficult task. It is also a culturally and intellectually valuable one. And the 
scientific study of religion can help religionists and theologians do it better. 
NOTE 
I am grateful to Olga Naidenko and Catherine Harris for their insightful com- 
ments on an early draft of this chapter. 
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